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The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has now persisted for nearly 70 years with little 
progress towards a solution, and the conflict continues to exact high costs on both 
societies year after year. Unfortunately, the failure of the Middle East peace process—in 
particular the Oslo Peace Process—has left little hope for a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict and has resulted in capricious violence within Israel and the Palestinian 
Territories since the 1990s. This study argues that economic development can reduce 
the magnitude of violence in the short term, but politically motivated violence will 
persist in the absence of a resolution. A historical analysis of Israeli-Palestinian 
economic dynamics reveals that Israel’s stringent control of the Palestinian Territories 
has exacted high costs on the Israeli economy since the 1967 Six-Day War. This leads 
to the conclusion that increasing the number of West Bank Palestinians working in 
Israel is the best path towards peace given the current state of affairs in the conflict. 
However, increasing the number of Palestinians working in Israel might result in an 
increase in the rate of violence. Using an agent-based dynamic equilibrium model and 
the best available research on the relationship between economic development, politics, 
and violence, this study finds that Israel should not impose border closures on 
Palestinians with work permits unless the rate of violence reaches 4.2 fatalities per day 
over a given period of time. Israeli economic production will not be reduced by 
violence even if Israel doubles the number of West Bank Palestinians working in Israel 




It may seem strange to invoke a work of fiction from Ryunosuke Akutagawa to 
explain the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but his fictional tale “Rashomon” is surprisingly 
relevant. Akutagawa was a Japanese writer whose works enjoyed limited popularity in 
the early 20th century. His fictional tale “Rashomon” showed that the same story could 
be reinterpreted and recreated from different angles according to who is identified as the 
protagonist, which thereby produces different parcels of an evasive truth.1 This 
phenomenon has come to be known as the Rashomon effect. You need not look any 
further than the opinion pieces written on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to see the 
multiplicity and divergence of interpretations at play in this context. The Rashomon 
effect has played a very important role in shaping the conflict, from its genesis roughly 
one hundred years ago until now.2 Israelis and Palestinians have reflected and deflected 
a sort of mirror image upon each other as individual actors interpret the trauma and 
obfuscation of violent, tragic events that have periodically punctuated this protracted 
conflict.3  
The feelings of confusion and alienation that are produced by tragic events have 
led to logical fallacies and a lack of empathy on both sides, which has kept peace at an 
impasse as self-fulfilling prophecies of ill-will perpetuate violence of varying 
magnitudes.4 Writing towards the beginning of the Second Intifada (a period of intense 
violence in the early 2000’s), Robert Malley argued pointedly that “the way the two 
                                                 
1 Steve Odin, “Derrida And The Decentered Universe Of Chan/Zen Buddhism,” Journal Of Chinese 
Philosophy, Vol.17, (1990): 61-86. 
2 Arie Kacowicz, “Rashomon In The Middle East: Clashing Narratives Of The Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict,” Cooperation And Conflict, Vol. 40, No.3, (2005): 343-360. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid, 346 
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sides choose to view yesterday largely will determine how they behave tomorrow,” and, 
if unchallenged, “their respective interpretations will gradually harden into divergent 
realities” that make peace seem impossible.5 Indeed, fifteen years later many experts 
have pointed out that a two-state solution to the conflict now seems more delusional 
than pragmatic, while also pointing out that a one-state solution threatens to undermine 
the democratic nature of Israel.6 Meanwhile, the Obama administration and Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have—at least in public statements—expressed 
commitment to a two-state solution despite the repeated failures of the Middle East 
peace process thus far.7   
While it is natural to view this conflict through Realist lenses, Israelis and 
Palestinians tend to forget or ignore their mutual interactions and interdependence as 
they interpret the world through the lens of their social reconstructions of reality. This 
has built figurative— and literal—barriers to peace that have made it seem as if the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is bound to continue indefinitely, but strategies that focus on 
economic development may offer a more hopeful alternative in a region that has rarely 
had hopeful outcomes. Economic development policies will not lead to a political 
solution on their own, but they will help to reduce the amount of political violence that 
arises from poor economic conditions in the Palestinian Territories. While this study 
makes no definite predictions about the timeline or nature of a final solution to the 
conflict—or the lack thereof— it does contribute to the literature on the economic 
                                                 
5 Robert Malley, “Fictions About The Failure At Camp David,” The New York Times, 8 Jul 2001, Web, 
Retrieved 4 Feb 2016, Http://Www.Nytimes.Com/2001/07/08/Opinion/Fictions-About-The-Failure-At-
Camp-David.Html. 
6 Padraig O’malley, The Two-State Delusion: Israel And Palestine- A Tale Of Two Narratives, Penguin 
Group, New York, NY, (2015). 
7 See: Jeffrey Heller And Matt Spetalnick, “Obama, Netanyahu At White House Seek To Mend U.S.-
Israel Ties,” Reuters, 9 Nov 2015, Web, Retrieved 4 Feb 2016, Http://Www.Reuters.Com/Article/Us-
Israel-Usa-Meeting-Iduskcn0sy1wj20151110. 
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relationship between Israel and the Palestinian Territories, which began in earnest after 
Israel took control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the 1967 Six Day War. 
The analysis found in this study focuses on the nexus between economics, politics, and 
violence that has developed post-1967. Economic development has been seen as a 
vehicle towards pacification throughout the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but thus far has 
not proven successful. The assumption underlying this study is that the status quo is not 
likely to change in the near future due to the current political climate, but the status quo 
is not indefinitely sustainable. Current Israeli President Reuven Rivlin summarized this 
fundamental dilemma, saying, “we will not forever live by the sword, but we will 
forever have to live with the sword, and we must be ready and willing to protect the 
Zionist enterprise and the land of Israel,” despite the hostile attacks carried out by 
Palestinians in recent months.8 The core argument of this work—that integrating more 
West Bank Palestinians into the Israeli labor force will promote economic development 
and reduce the magnitude of violence—relates to capitalist peace theory.  
Both Israeli and Palestinian politicians have committed to capitalist peace 
policies over the past decade, though the goals of the economic development programs 
implemented by both sides have been quite different.9 Israeli governments have pursued 
strategies to develop the West Bank economically since the aftermath of the 1967 Six-
Day War when Moshe Dayan advocated for Israeli-Palestinian economic integration. 
Prime Minister Netanyahu renewed focus on Palestinian economic development after 
the 2009 election when he “created an administrative body whose mandate is to endorse 
                                                 
8 “Rivlin: Peace With Palestinians Seems Impossible Right Now,” The Times Of Israel, 8 Feb 2016, Web, 
Retrieved 8 Feb 2016, Http://Www.Timesofisrael.Com/Rivlin-Peace-With-Palestinians-Seems-
Impossible-Right-Now/?Utm_Source=Dlvr.It&Utm_Medium=Twitter. 
9  Alaa Tartier “Securitized Development And Palestinian Authoritarianism Under Fayyadism,” Conflict, 
Security, And Development, Vol.15, No.5, (2015): 479-502. 
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economic peace in the West Bank through advancing around 25 economic initiatives” in 
coordination with the PA.10 This directly followed the creation of economic 
development initiatives by the Palestinian Authority (PA). In 2007 then-PA Prime 
Minister Salam Fayyad implemented various neo-liberal approaches to economic 
development and state building.11 The stated goal of Fayyad’s economic development 
policies were “self-reliance and self-empowerment,” which were to be achieved by 
focusing on providing “good governance, economic opportunity, and the rule of law.”12 
These goals were meant, “to build strong state institutions capable of providing for the 
needs of [the Palestinians]” while under and/or despite Israeli authority.13 The unstated 
goal of PA economic development programs might be to strengthen Palestinian 
initiatives at the UN, which has become an avenue through which Palestinians have 
sought to bypass the traditional peace process.14 Both Israelis and Palestinians have 
prioritized economic development, but Israel has championed economic development as 
a method of containing violence in the absence of a political solution to the conflict, 
while the PA has championed economic development as a path towards increased 
autonomy in the hopes that this will increase Palestinian legitimacy in their bids to the 
UN.15   
Despite the differences in the goals of Israeli and Palestinian economic 
development initiatives, the commitment to economic development in general makes 
integrating more West Bank Palestinians into the Israeli labor force politically 
                                                 
10 Tariq Dana, “The Symbiosis Between Palestinian ‘Fayyadism’ And Israeli ‘Economic Peace’: The 
Political Economy Of Capitalist Peace In The Context Of Colonisation,” Conflict, Security & 
Development, Vol.15, No.5, (2015): 455-477. 
11 Ibid, 466.  





pragmatic. In January 2016, the Israeli security cabinet approved the military’s request 
that 30,000 more Palestinians be allowed to work in Israel.16 The logic behind this move 
is simple: a partial reduction of the closure regime in the West Bank should improve 
economic standards of living, and economic growth should “weaken the tendency 
towards violence and ensure Palestinian acceptance of the political status quo.”17 In this 
way Netanyahu’s economic peace initiatives diverge from traditional capitalist peace 
perspectives: economic development is not perceived as a path to a peaceful political 
solution but is rather seen as “a convenient substitute for the political process.”18 The 
cyclical violence that has emerged in the twenty years after the Oslo Accords suggests 
that the influence of Palestinian political ideologies and Palestinian nationalistic 
aspirations are too strong to be subdued by economic development alone. Keeping this 
in mind, this work diverges from traditional capitalist peace perspectives; economic 
development is not considered a replacement for a political process as Netanyahu might 
hope, but economic development is seen as a way to reduce the level of violence in the 
conflict in the short term in the hopes that a more trusting political climate for 
negotiations may be formed when and if negotiations renew.  
This work is organized topically rather than chronologically, but efforts are 
made to execute analysis as chronologically as possible. Following this introduction is a 
general literature review that focuses on the various studies that have analyzed the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict with particular emphasis on the Middle East Peace Process 
                                                 
16 Amos Harel, “Military Wants 30,000 More Palestinians Working In Israel,” Haaretz, 8 Feb 2016, Web, 
Retrieved 8 Feb 2016, Http://Www.Haaretz.Com/Israel-News/.Premium-1.702003  
17 Dana, “The Symbiosis,” 466  
18 Ibid. 
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and Capitalist Peace theory. At various points throughout the study more literature is 
examined when particular subjects need clarification.   
  Chapter 1 is a historical analysis of the political and ideological influences that 
shaped Israeli-Palestinian economics. Analysis begins after the 1967 Six-Day War, 
where the question of a one-state or two-state solution became prominent and the 
Middle East Peace Process truly took shape. The focus of this section will be the 
economic relationship between Israel and the Palestinian territories, specifically the 
movement of goods and people. This section should make it clear that Israeli economic 
policies have contributed to stagnant economic growth in the Palestinian Territories 
post-1967 and have thereby contributed to the precipitation of Palestinian political 
violence. The following section will focus on Israel’s unique security challenges, which 
have necessitated high Israeli defense spending and have contributed to creating a 
number of unique socio-economic challenges.  
 Chapter 2 argues that peace is an undeniably preferential outcome for Israelis 
and Palestinians, but the failure of the Oslo Accords and the erratic labor flows that 
followed has contributed to Palestinian violence. This chapter explains how the 
economic relationship between Israel and the Palestinian Territories changed as a result 
of the Oslo peace process. The enforcement of a strict Israeli permit system for 
Palestinian workers and the imposition of border closures during times of violence are 
the defining features that have contributed to erratic Palestinian labor flows since 1993. 
The end of this chapter examines the impact of border closures on Palestinian violence 
and serves as a transition into the econometric analysis found in Chapter 3.  
 7 
Chapter 3 features an agent-based dynamic equilibrium model that evaluates the 
impacts of integrating more West Bank Palestinians into the Israeli economy. This 
chapter argues that allowing more West Bank Palestinians to work in Israel would 
benefit both Israelis and Palestinians in the short term by bolstering Palestinian 
economic development, thereby reducing the short-term likelihood of widespread 
political violence. This argument— and the counterargument that allowing more 
Palestinians to work in Israel would result in more violence— is tested using an agent-
based economic model. Such a policy would not constitute a sizable shift from current 
practices, but would in fact better embody the official approaches adopted by the Israeli 
government and the Palestinian Authority. The model shows that Israel should not 
impose border closures on Palestinians with work permits unless the rate of violence 
reaches 4.2 fatalities per day over a given period of time, and Israeli economic 
production will not be reduced by violence even if Israel doubles the number of West 
Bank Palestinians working in Israel to above 200,000.  
 8 
Chapter 1: Establishing a Cycle of Violence: Israel’s Economic and 
Political Relations with the Palestinian Territories (1967-1993)  
 
1.1 Literature Review 
 
The approach utilized to study international issues is often deeply reflective of 
the elements present in that particular issue, so it should come as no surprise that most 
studies on the Middle East Peace Process fit within the Realist school of international 
relations (IR) theory. Realism was developed primarily during the Cold War period and 
consequently reflects the fundamental set of assumptions that characterized foreign 
policy during that conflictual time: states operating in an environment of anarchy must 
proliferate security capabilities in order to minimize the security dilemma facing their 
country.19 The perpetual implementation of various modes of warfare in this conflict 
lends credence to a Realist interpretation, but this approach is incomplete. To echo IR 
scholar Robert Keohane, Realist explanations are “better at telling us why we are in 
such trouble than how to get out of it,” or in this context, Realist explanations help to 
establish why Israelis and Palestinians have continued to fight but do little in terms of 
offering potential solutions.20 
Many scholars who seek potential solutions choose to focus on the actual 
negotiations that have occurred in this conflict, but these studies fail to create complete 
understandings of the impediments to peace. Studies that explain the intricacies of the 
negotiation processes in this conflict are part of a subset of Realist IR scholarship that 
                                                 
19 Kenneth Waltz, Theory Of International Politics, Mcgraw Hill, New York, NY, (1979). Michael, 
Barnett And Raymond Duvall, “Power In International Politics,” International Organization, Vol.59, 
No.1, (2005): 39-75. Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation And The Balance Of World Power,” 
International Security, Vol.9, No.4, (1985): 3-43. Robert Gilpin, War And Change In International 
Politics, Cambridge University Press, New York, (1981). 
20 Robert O. Keohane, Ed., Neorealism And Its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 
(1988): 198. 
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tends to focus on game theory and other types of bargaining rationale.21 These studies 
tend to rely on Realist assumptions, which are useful because it allows observers of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict to interpret particular events according to established 
frameworks. While this can be useful, this approach does not focus exclusively on the 
unique set of factors that have characterized this particular conflict and therefore creates 
generalized analysis that lacks contextual nuance. In an attempt to create more nuanced 
and more focused studies of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, many scholars have 
chosen to evaluate the influence that particular agents have had on the Peace Process.22 
These studies usually include evaluations of the Israeli and Palestinian leaders engaged 
in negotiation, though some focus more on the efficacy of the United States (and U.S. 
leaders) as a mediator.23 These evaluations do not sufficiently explain why particular 
issues are so contentious, but they do offer a clear look at the intricacies of the 
bargaining process. 
 All of the previously mentioned studies add to the understanding of the Arab-
Israeli conflict, but they do not aptly evaluate the nexus between politics, economics, 
and violence and therefore offer little in terms of potential solutions. This has prompted 
some scholars to focus on Capitalist Peace theories, which is a subset of Liberal IR 
                                                 
21 Fred C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, Harper And Row, New York, NY, (1964). Harold Muller, 
“Arguing, Bargaining, And All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory, And The Logic Of 
Appropriateness In International Relations,” European Journal Of International Relations, Vol.10, No.3, 
(2004): 395-435. Dan Reiter, “Exploring The Bargaining Model Of War,” Perspectives On Politics, 
Vol.1, No.1, (2003): 27-43. James Morrow, “Capabilities, Uncertainty, And Resolve: A Limited 
Information Model Of Crisis Bargaining,” American Journal Of Political Science, Vol.33, No.4, (1989): 
931-972. Roger Fisher And William Ury, “Getting To Yes”, In David P. Barash, Ed., Approaches To 
Peace, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, (2000): 70-76. 
22 Kenneth W. Stein And Samuel W. Lewis, Making Peace Among Arabs And Israelis: Lessons From 
Fifty Years Of Negotiating Experience, USIP, Washington, DC, (1991). William Zartman, “Negotiations 
As A Mechanism For Resolution In The Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Davis Occasional Papers, No.72, August 
(1999).  
23 Saadia Touval, “Mediation In The Arab-Israeli Conflict During And After The Cold War,” Davis 
Occasional Papers, No.74, October (1999). Daniel C. Kurtzer And Scott B. Lasensky, Negotiating Arab-
Israeli Peace: American Leadership In The Middle East, USIP, Washington, Dc, (2008). 
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scholarship that is closely related to Democratic Peace theories. Early theorists like 
Montesquieu, Bastiat, and Mill propounded ideas similar to the Capitalist Peace theory, 
but these ideas lost traction in the wake of two World Wars and throughout the Realist-
dominated Cold War era.24 Capitalist Peace remained alive through U.S. foreign policy 
strategies such as foreign aid and trade liberalization, but Capitalist Peace theories were 
not popularized until the post-Cold War era through the work of Erik Gartzke and 
others.25 This study features a more simplistic conception of the Capitalist Peace theory, 
namely the assumption that economic development reduces the likelihood of violent 
conflict, but the Realist tendencies of this conflict are too pervasive to hope that 
economic development is enough to bring about peace independently. This prompts a 
closer look at the economic relationship between Israel and the Palestinian Territories, 
which reveals that labor economics among West Bank Palestinians is the most relevant 
for an evaluation influenced by Capitalist Peace theories. The politics and economics of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are distinctly separate; the West Bank is much more 
integrated with Israel and is generally perceived as less radical politically, so West Bank 
Palestinians are the only laborers relevant to the analysis found in Chapter 3. 
Studies on the Israeli and Palestinian economies relate to a larger field of work 
that evaluates the economic costs of political conflict, which has been a subject of 
interest to economists for quite some time. Scholars have established that conflict 
negatively impacts economic development,26 but the strand of literature concerning the 
                                                 
24 Erik Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace,” American Journal Of Political Science, Vol.51, No.1, (January 
2007):166-191. Erik Gartzke and Alex Weisiger, “Under Construction: Development, Democracy, And 
Difference As Determinants Of Systemic Liberal Peace,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.58, Iss.1, 
(March 2014): 130-145. 
25 Gartzke And Weisiger, “Under Construction” 
26 Alberto Abadie, And Javier Gardeazabal, “The Economic Costs Of Conflict,” American Economic 
Review, Vol.93, No.1, (2003): 113–132. 
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relationship between economic conditions and violence has not been as conclusive. 
These studies hypothesize that poor economic conditions lower the opportunity cost of 
involvement in political violence, which thereby makes it easier to motivate 
participation in political violence among frustrated citizens who see no alternative path 
towards change.27 Empirical studies have found that better economic conditions are 
associated with less violence,28 the same level of violence,29 and even more violence30 
than is observed in poorly developed areas. As a result, many scholars still debate 
whether violence is the creator or product of political ineptitude and economic 
stagnation. This debate has not been settled and for good reason: conflict is perpetuated 
by the nexus between violence, political ineptitude, and economic stagnation, with each 
part exerting different degrees of influence in different contexts. In the Palestinian 
context, economic development exacerbates violence by agitating hostile political 
attitudes. 
Studies have shown that violence in the Palestinian context is epiphenomenal, 
which has important implications for peaceful conflict resolution. Several previous 
studies have linked poor economic conditions in the Palestinian territories to increased 
                                                 
27 For an example of a study that starts with this assumption, see: Andreas Freytag, Jens J. Kruger, Daniel 
Meierrieks, And Friedrich Schneider, “The Origins Of Terrorism: Cross-Country Estimates Of Socio-
Economic Determinants Of Terrorism,” European Journal Of Political Economy, Vol. 27, Sec.5–16, 
(2011). 
28 S. Brock Blomberg, Gregory D. Hess, And Akila Weerapana, “Economic Conditions And Terrorism,” 
European Journal Of Political Economy, Vol. 20, No. 2, (2004): 463-478. Jose Tavares, “The Open 
Society Assesses Its Enemies: Shocks, Disasters And Terrorist Attacks,” Journal Of Monetary Economics 
Vol.51, No.5, (2004): 1039–1070. 
29 Alberto Abadie, ”Poverty, Political Freedom, And The Roots Of Terrorism. American Economic 
Review Vol.96, No.2, (2006): 50–56. Alan Krueger And David Laitin, “Kto Kogo? A Cross-Country 
Study Of The Origins And Targets Of Terrorism,” In: Philip Keefer And Norman Loayza (Eds.), 
Terrorism, Economic Development, And Political Openness, Cambridge University Press, New York, 
(2008), 148–173. 
30 “Aid Under Fire: Development Projects And Civil Conflict,” Belfer Center Discussion Paper, No. 
2010-18, Harvard Kennedy School, (November 2010). Eli Berman, Michael Callen, Joseph H. Felter And 
Jacob N. Shapiro, “Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment In Afghanistan, Iraq, And 
The Philippines,” Journal Of Conflict Resolution, Vol.55, No.4, (2011): 496–528. 
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Palestinian involvement in the conflict with Israel.31 It has been clearly established that 
Israel’s labor restrictive policies harm economic conditions in the Palestinian territories, 
but the narrow focus that is required to convincingly prove that these policies have a 
causal effect has resulted in scholars neglecting the implications this has for the conflict 
more broadly. This study will be unique in the way that it relates the observed effects of 
Israel’s labor restrictive policies to the prospects for peaceful conflict resolution moving 
forward. This is particularly important given the prevalence of policies that focus on 
Palestinian economic development in recent years. The beginning point for this analysis 
is the 1967 Six-Day War and the economic policies that followed Israeli control of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  
                                                 
31 Edward Sayre, “Labor Market Conditions, Political Events, And Palestinian Suicide Bombings,” Peace 
Economics, Peace Science And Public Policy, Vol. 15, No. 1, (2009): 1–26. Basel A. Saleh, “An 
Econometric Analysis Of Palestinian Attacks: An Examination Of Deprivation Theory And Choice Of 
Attacks,” European Journal Of Social Sciences, Vol.7, No.4, (2009): 17–29. Basel A. Saleh, “Economic 
Conditions And Resistance To Occupation In The West Bank And Gaza Strip: There Is A Causal 
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1.2 Israel’s Economic Management of the Palestinian Territories: 1967-1993 
 
The economic dynamics between Israel and the Palestinian Territories were 
established by the same event that complicated the pre-existing one-state versus two-
state dilemma: the 1967 Six-Day War. While there were doubts about Israel’s ability to 
maintain control of the Palestinian territories, Israeli policymakers were more 
concerned with the implications of doing so.32 Fully erasing the pre-1967 borders meant 
forming one geopolitical unit, thereby creating a new reality in which Palestinians were 
firmly within Israel’s political and economic sphere of responsibility. Conversely, 
allowing the pre-1967 borders to persist may have led to the establishment of two 
distinctly separate economic and political units within the narrow strip of land between 
the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Coast.33 Both integration and separation 
threatened to undermine the strategic interests of Israel. This dilemma exposed the 
fundamental tensions between Israel’s Jewish religious influences and its democratic 
governance model.34 The unusual economic relationship that emerged between Israel 
and the Palestinian Territories post-1967 has reflected the one-state or two-state 
dilemma that has persisted henceforth, and the economic policies that were 
implemented in the Palestinian Territories after 1967 were designed to serve Israeli 
political, military, and economic interests.35 Unfortunately, Israel’s economic policies 
towards the Palestinians have more or less determined economic development within 
the West Bank and Gaza, and consequentially, the lack of economic development in the 
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Territories has exacerbated political violence by compounding the feelings of relative 
deprivation that stoke the flames of sociopolitical unrest.   
Even though the literature concerning the relationship between economics and 
violence is not conclusive, economists have consistently linked economic conditions to 
political violence in empirical studies. As far back as 1973, Manoucher Parvin noted the 
importance of economic factors as the “main explanatory variable of political 
violence.”36 The results of his study indicated that income inequality, gross national 
product, and the growth rate of the economy could explain a significant percentage of 
variations in the level of political unrest in the 26 countries he analyzed. Other cross-
country studies have found similar evidence. Nafziger and Auvinen found that their 
measures of conflict were inversely related to real GDP growth, GNP per capita, food 
output growth, and IMF funding.37 In 2001, Fearon and Laitin sought to include the 
influences of ethnic nationalism in their analysis of the determinants of civil wars. They 
found that the factors that explain which countries have been prone to experience civil 
war “were not their ethnic or religious characteristics” but rather “the conditions that 
favor insurgency.” The conditions they identified as favoring insurgency included 
“poverty and slow growth,” which in their findings “favor rebel recruitment and mark 
financially and bureaucratically weak states.”38 These conditions have certainly 
characterized the Palestinian economies, which lend credence to the assertion that poor 
economic conditions can exacerbate political violence in some instances. The 
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connection between violence and poor economic conditions is robust across a number 
of different empirical methods of analysis, but economics should not be seen as the only 
explanatory factor contributing to violent conflict. There are certainly countries that 
exhibit “the conditions that favor insurgency” but experience less violence than would 
be expected.39 However important economic determinants may be, both political and 
economic factors must be included in any analysis of the determinants of violence lest 
exceptions or extraordinary adherents to the rule become inexplicable.  
Poor economic conditions have contributed to violence by exacerbating political 
tensions between Palestinians and between Palestinians and Israelis. In the period 
following the First and Second Intifada numerous studies have found that poor 
economic conditions explain periods of intense violence with a high degree of statistical 
significance, but these studies also note that economic conditions are not the sole 
determinants of political violence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.40 Some of these 
studies note that perpetrators of violence do not always have poor backgrounds, and in 
some cases, relatively wealthy individuals have engaged in violent activities. These 
cases can be explained by political factors, such as the influence of Palestinian 
nationalism. The 1967 Six-Day War dealt a blow to the support for secular nationalist 
and Arab socialist regimes throughout the Middle East, and as a result, the influence of 
Islamist ideology transformed the Palestinian political landscape by wedding 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Hani Mansour, “The Effects Of Labor Supply Shocks On Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence From The 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Labour Economics, Vol.17, (2010): 930-939. Sami H. Miaari And Robert 
Sauer, “The Labor Market Costs Of Conflict: Closures, Foreign Workers, and Palestinian Employment 
And Earnings,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 2282. Basel A. Saleh, “Economic Conditions And Resistance.” 
Basel A. Saleh, “An Econometric Analysis Of Palestinian Attacks.” Sami H. Miaari, Asaf Zussman, And 
Noam Zussman, “Employment Restrictions And Political Conflict In The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” 
Journal Of Economic Behavior And Organization, Vol. 101, (2014): 24-44, Edward A. Sayre, “Labor 
Market Conditions, Political Events.” 
 16 
Palestinian patriotism and Islamic revolutionary ideology.41 This process resulted in the 
strengthening of support for the PLO, Islamic Jihad, and eventually the foundation of 
Hamas. These Islamist nationalist movements have attracted varying degrees of support 
from a wide range of economic backgrounds, but this does not undermine the 
connection between economics and violence.  
In his 1990 study that compared the First Intifada with the Arab Revolt of 1936, 
Stein found that there was growing political frustration among Palestinian citizens in the 
period prior to both of these violent revolts. Crucially, Stein noted that in both cases this 
political frustration was fueled by “economic hardship” that was  “borne of 
unemployment and underemployment, the drying up of traditional sources of capital 
import, and dramatic price drops, particularly in agriculture.”42 Stein notes that the poor 
economic conditions in both of these periods exposed intra-Palestinian disputes over the 
best path towards sovereignty and prevented the widespread coordination that may have 
made non-violent or violent revolt more effective in achieving their purposes. His 
comparison shows that Palestinian revolt has been cyclical and has always been 
influenced by economic factors to some extent. Stein’s analysis also shows that 
economic determinants are important, but the connection between economics and 
violence should not be interpreted erroneously. Improving economic conditions will not 
eliminate violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict altogether, but it will reduce it.43 In 
order to understand how economic development may quell political violence, it is 
important to understand how the economic relationship between Israel and the 
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Palestinian Territories developed after the 1967 Six-Day War.  
Labor flows and bilateral trade were at the core of Israeli economic decision-
making directly following the Six-Day War, primarily because Israeli leaders 
recognized that these two elements would determine the welfare of the Palestinian 
people.44 Prior to 1967, Egypt and Jordan administrated Gaza and the West Bank; 
Israeli leaders recognized that separating the Palestinian Territories from Egypt, Jordan, 
and Israel after 1967 would have led to a rapid deterioration of living standards, which 
was unacceptable to both the Israeli government and military.45 This understanding— 
that movement of either labor or goods had to be allowed between Israel and the 
Palestinian Territories —formed the foundations for the economic structure that 
emerged from Israeli debates following the Six-Day War.  
Directly after the Six-Day War, disagreements over the ideal level of integration 
slowed the development of a stable economic relationship between Israel and the 
Palestinian Territories. The unofficial leader of the integration camp was Israeli Defense 
Minister Moshe Dayan. Dayan’s policy was “to award the Palestinians individual 
subsistence without national dignity,” according to a former colleague.46 Dayan argued 
that integrating Israel and the Palestinian Territories would produce a higher standard of 
living for Palestinians, which would bolster Israel’s security as economic development 
stymied Palestinian discontent and political aspirations.47 Dayan’s view-that economic 
development will stem discontent-has been the dominant view by Israeli policymakers 
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ever since, but Israeli policy has failed to consider the complexity of Palestinian politics 
and has therefore wrongly assumed that development would quell nationalistic 
aspirations altogether. The level of integration that Dayan propagated never 
materialized due to the influences of the anti-integration camp. Opponents of integration 
had two primary concerns: first, they worried that competition from Palestinian 
industries might be a threat to the Israeli economy, and second, they worried that 
integration of Palestinian labor would result in Israelis losing jobs. However, these 
concerns stemmed from the condition of the Israeli economy directly preceding the 
1967 war (during a sharp recession in 1966 Israeli unemployment reached a record-high 
10%).48 By 1969, Israeli economic conditions and the labor market were such that 
erasing labor borders was not met with much opposition from professional economists 
or government policy-makers.49 The movement of goods, however, was not looked 
upon as favorably. After about 5 years a system developed in which labor flowed 
relatively freely between the Palestinian Territories and Israel, but the trade borders 
were delineated so that only a limited number of Palestinian goods could be sold in 
Israel with limitations designed to protect Israeli producers, especially in the 
agricultural sector.50 
The trade regime that was established to manage both Israel and the Palestinian 
Territories was a quasi-customs union, but this customs union was a unilaterally shaped 
trade agreement in which Israel dictated terms according to Israeli needs.51 Prior to 
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1967, the West Bank supplied neighboring Arab markets with a limited number of 
commodities and manufactured goods, and the Gaza Strip’s exports were well 
established in a number of European markets.52 Unfortunately, existing institutions for 
external trade in the Palestinian Territories were slowly amended, replaced, or totally 
suspended between 1967 and 1989 in order to meet Israeli economic needs.53 This 
resulted in a major trade deficit for the Palestinian Territories, as Israeli goods flowed 
into the Territories with no restrictions while Palestinian productive capacity and 
external trade relations stagnated.54  
Israeli politics are to blame for the lack of development in the Palestinian 
manufacturing sector, which normally should have grown to meet the deficit in the 
balance of payments that was created by excessive Israeli imports.55 The movement of 
both agricultural and manufactured goods between Israel and the Territories was 
controlled early on, but over time the Israeli government used other methods to protect 
Israeli producers. For example, Palestinian entrepreneurs had to apply for licenses from 
the Israeli authorities for many of the economic activities they sought to initiate, which 
slowed and sometimes limited productive capacity.56 The desire to protect Israeli 
producers was so great that Israel actively “attempted to prevent the establishment or 
reactivation of Arab-owned factories if there was any danger that their products might 
compete with Israeli products.”57 Nevertheless, the lack of an industrial sector in the 
Palestinian Territories and the major trade deficit did not altogether prevent increases in 
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the standard of living for many Palestinians during this period. For example, the GDP of 
the West Bank grew from 459 million NIS in 1968 to 1,726 million NIS by 1987 (1986 
prices).58 The movement of Palestinian labor explains much of this growth.  
This unique system of economic relations between Israel and the Territories 
persisted until the Oslo Accords: excessive imports flowing from Israel into the 
Palestinian Territories created a large deficit in the balance of payments, which was 
covered by the increase in Palestinian commuter/migrants working in Israel, unilateral 
transfers, and inflows of capital from abroad.59 Income from Palestinian 
commuter/migrants working in Israel covered a large part of the deficit in the balance of 
payments and also contributed to a gradual growth in standards of living in both the 
West Bank and Gaza. As noted in Table 1, GNP growth per person in the West Bank 
averaged 4% annually from 1973 to 1979 and 6% in Gaza during the same time period. 
GNP growth per person averaged 2% annually for both Territories from 1980-1987.60 
Palestinians who worked in Israel earned wages much higher than Palestinians working 
in the Territories even though their pay was lower than that of Israelis.61 In 1968 the 
ratio between Palestinian wages in the Israeli labor market and their “home” labor 
market was approximately 2:1. However, by 1972 this wage gap shrank considerably to 
1.2:1 and it remained near to this level until the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987.62 
Even though employment in Israel helped soften the blow of Israel’s economic policies 
by establishing Palestinian labor as an export, this did not replace the creation of a 
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conventional economic system for the Palestinian territories.  
Palestinian employment in Israel helped to develop the Israeli economy by 
providing a massive reservoir of cheap labor to produce value-added goods, but Israel—
in addition to preventing the development of a Palestinian industrial sector— also 
neglected to develop the institutional capacity of the Palestinian economies. Israel never 
created a macroeconomic policy designed to serve the needs of the Palestinian 
economy, and a Palestinian currency was never created, so neither was any monetary 
policy for the Palestinians.63 The Palestinian banking system, which was really 
Jordanian to begin with, was closed by military order after 1967 and did not reopen 
until the 1980’s (and even then in a limited manner). Financial institutions barely 
existed and would have been altogether nonexistent if not for a network of 
moneychangers working with the Jordanian banking system that carried out minimal 
financial transactions.64  
The Israeli economic policies implemented after 1967 resulted in a modern 
Palestinian economy that is industrially weak, underdeveloped, and heavily dependent 
on Israeli imports. Israeli economic policies towards the Territories, at least until the 
1990s, were designed to slow down Palestinian economic development, and the result 
was the transformation of the Palestinian economy into a captive market for Israeli 
producers and a reservoir of cheap labor.65 In the words of Israeli Major General 
Schlomo Gazit— the first Coordinator of Activities in the Territories under Moshe 
Dayan— “Israeli policies in the administered territories led to a strange combination of 
relative economic prosperity” that was achieved “ by the simple expedient of importing 
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labor services from the territories into the Israeli economy.” While this improved 
standards of living for many Palestinians, “the Israeli authorities and military 
government did little to develop the economic infrastructure” in the Palestinian 
Territories.66 Israel’s economic management of the Palestinian Territories has made 
work in Israel the most lucrative option for many Palestinians, which is a reflection of 
the limited self-determination that Palestinians have had under Israeli control, and the 
ongoing conflict has also damaged Israeli society by necessitating unusually high 
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GS WB GS WB GS 
1968-1972 522 199 15 11 20 18 21 17 20 9 67 64 22 21 2.6 1 
1973-1979 904 306 6 7 4 6 30 37 32 28 73 109 25 36 3.1 1.1 
1980-1987 1344 379 5 3 2 2 32 45 28 57 63 123 24 43 3.5 1 
1989-1993 1951 574 8 7 5 5 31 34 30 46 - 79 - 14 2.9 1.1 
Sources: National Accounts Of Judea, Samaria And The Gaza Area 1968-1993, Israel Central Bureau Of Statistics: Special Report #1012, 
Jerusalem, 1996, Judea, Samaria, And Gaza Area Statistics, Israel Central Bureau Of Statistics, Jerusalem, Various Years, Statistical 
Abstract Of Israel, Israel Central Bureau Of Statistics, Jerusalem, Various Years, Arnon, “Israeli Policy Towards,” 577, Personal 
Calculations 







Table 2: Industrial Origin of Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost: The West Bank and Gaza Strip 1968-1986          
(Millions USD at 1989 Prices and Percentages of GDP) 






GDP Total GNP GDP as 
% of 
GNP 
 USD % USD % USD % USD % USD % USD  % USD  
1968 46 34 9 7 3 1 26 19 48 36 131 100 134 98 
1975 161 29 46 9 88 16 85 16 164 30 543 100 748 73 
1980 346 33 80 7 166 16 135 13 323 31 1050 100 1,425 74 
1981 279 30 69 7 172 18 153 16 275 29 948 100 1,361 70 
1982 264 26 70 7 186 19 158 16 318 32 1,001 100 1,504 67 
1983 249 24 81 8 189 18 183 17 345 33 1,047 100 1,596 66 
1984 184 19 77 8 175 18 205 21 347 35 989 100 1,419 70 
1985 188 20 76 8 161 17 165 17 356 38 945 100 1,307 72 
1986 455 30 130 9 235 16 177 12 496 33 1,494 100 1,982 75 
Source: Palestinian External Trade Under Israeli Occupation, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Geneva, Switzerland, 1989
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1.3 A Necessary Evil: The Determinants and Consequences of Extraordinary 
Defense Spending in Israel 
 
Unfortunately, the vast majority of Israelis and Palestinians have only known what 
it is like to live in the midst of the conflict. As of December 2013, 95% of the 
population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and around 90% of the population of 
Israel, were born after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Roughly 85% of 
Palestinians, and 70% of Israelis, were born after Israel took control of the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip in 1967.67 Moreover, Israel has been forced to devote massive 
amounts of resources to defense over the years due to the evolving security threats that 
have emerged since 1967. In financial terms, hundreds of billions of dollars have been 
spent to support, oppose, or resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in some way. 
However, even the cumulative sum of expenditures does not begin to capture either the 
opportunity costs of the conflict (alternative ways in which resources could have been 
used to enhance the lives of the regions residents), the emotional costs of the conflict, or 
the invaluable cost of human life.68 Israel’s extraordinary defense expenditures have 
been a necessary evil in a hostile region, but it is undeniable that high defense spending 
has weakened Israel’s economy by diverting spending towards security rather than other 
national priorities, such as social welfare programs.  
Israeli defense expenditures have been determined by a complex array of 
factors, but these factors can be condensed into three levels of analysis: the national, the 
regional, and the international.69 At the national level, electoral cycles and political 
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parties have shaped Israeli defense budgets to reflect political priorities (as might be 
expected during budget negotiations), but in Israel, the military establishment has also 
been able to exert influence on the size of the overall national budget. This “bottom up” 
influence from the military establishment distinguishes Israel from other countries in 
which defense expenditures are primarily determined from the “top-down” by 
politicians.70 This may be due to the prominent role that the military plays in Israeli 
society, but it is at least partially due to the unique geopolitical challenges Israel faces. 
These geopolitical concerns have been influenced by the regional politics of the Middle 
East, particularly the Middle East arms race during the Cold War, the influences of non-
state actors like Hizbullah and Islamist groups throughout the region, the threat of 
regional rivals like Iran, and the protracted conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. 
These regional concerns were also influenced by more broad international trends that 
affected Israel directly during the Cold War, such as the global rise of terrorism and the 
superpower politics that shaped worldwide defense spending in that era. All of these 
factors have combined to make Israeli security expenditures frequently larger than any 
other country in the world (per capita), including the United States. 
Israeli militarization has been fueled in part by Israel’s unique geopolitical 
security concerns, which have dictated national defense strategy. Preemption and 
prevention (of aggression against Israel) emerged as the central tenants of Israeli 
security discourse under the first Prime Minister: David Ben-Gurion.71 This should not 
be surprising considering Israel’s position as a small fledgling country that was 
surrounded by large Arab countries bent on putting an end to the Jewish state. Israel’s 
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resolve to prevent a major invasion/attack rendered preemption and prevention more or 
less the determining factors in Israeli military strategy in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis, 
the 1967 Six-Day War, and the 1982 War in Lebanon. Israel’s security dilemma has of 
course evolved over the years, but at its core, Israeli defense doctrine in the military 
establishment has centered on preempting and preventing aggression against Israel 
whether threats be certain or unlikely and whether the aggressor be an individual, a non-
state guerrilla group, another state, or recently, the Iranian nuclear program. 
1967 is a watershed year in the ideological history of the Middle East; Israel’s 
victory in the Six-Day War put an end to popular support for Pan-Arab socialist 
movements and the ideals they embodied, which left an ideological void that was 
partially filled by the rise of Islamist ideologies throughout the Middle East region. 
Arab defeat in the Six-Day War prompted some Muslims to insist that such a crushing 
defeat mandated a return to Islam.72 They argued that only the religious piety of Israel 
could explain Israeli victories against several large Arab nations. Claims such as these 
gained momentum in the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the assassination of 
Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat by Islamists in 1981, and the emergence of 
Hizbullah as a major force in Lebanon- “all of which reflected and in turn accelerated 
the mobilization of Islam for political transformation.”73 The influence of Islamism 
didn’t gain momentum in the Palestinian Territories for quite some time after the Six-
Day War, in part because secular national liberation movements retained a particularly 
strong political appeal in the absence of a sovereign state.74 Eventually Islamic Jihad, 
which was officially founded in 1980, emerged “to oppose the gradualism of the 
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Muslim Brotherhood and the PLO strategy of ‘occupation management.’”75 Islamic 
Jihad cut a clear path for Hamas by wedding Islamism and Palestinian nationalistic 
aspirations, “thereby lending a religious imprimatur to every anti-Israeli act, pacific and 
violent alike.”76  
The result of these ideological changes that occurred throughout the Middle 
East, when combined with other international trends during the Cold War, was a global 
redefinition of the security dilemma that took place throughout the 1970s and 1980s.77 
Following the Six-Day War, global terror attacks continued a pre-existing trend of 
increasing in frequency. Between 1976 and 1979 the frequency of global terrorist 
attacks almost tripled, and the rate of attacks continued to rise until the number of 
worldwide terrorist attacks reached their twentieth century zenith at more than 5,100 in 
1992.78 Revolutionary movements around the world contributed to this trend, including 
(but not limited to) Islamist militant groups based in the Middle East who were inspired 
by the revolutionary writings of Sayyid Qutb.79 Islamist groups in the broader Middle 
East didn not contribute to attacks against Israel very often despite anti-Israeli rhetoric, 
but Israel came to rank among the top 20 countries most frequently targeted by terrorist 
attacks despite (and certainly contributing to) Israel’s history of high defense spending. 
The vast majority of attacks came from Palestinian nationalist groups that were largely 
secular before the 1980s, especially the PLO. As the influences of Islamist ideologies 
grew and the broader Cold War arms race took shape, Israel was forced to focus on 
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ensuring the security of individual citizens—in addition to the preservation of borders— 
while facing growing threats from within Israeli-controlled lands and surrounding areas.  
  By challenging state-centered security paradigms, revolutionary movements 
forming in the Middle East and beyond fueled a Third World arms race financed largely 
by the U.S. and the Soviet Union.80 To put this arms race in perspective, consider that 
defense expenditures in the Third World alone grew from $104 billion in 1972 to $182 
billion in 1982.81 Such a rapid growth was “clearly a by-product not only of security 
considerations but also of domestic politics and economic influences” that shaped the 
decisions of these countries.82 During this era of growing terrorism and bloating 
military expenditures, threats against Israel became all-too-common in the apologetic 
statements and documents released by various revolutionary Islamist groups, including 
the PLO, Islamic Jihad, and eventually Hamas and Al-Qaeda.83 Even though these 
threats were mostly empty, they represent the internationalization of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and reflect the extent to which the conflict took on a particularly 
religious tone through the ideological transformations that followed the Six-Day War. 
Understanding these regional and international trends clarifies why Arab-Israeli peace 
became a major foreign policy goal for the U.S. throughout the Cold War era and 
clarifies why Israeli security spending was so high throughout this period. 
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These evolving threats influenced the development of a special relationship 
between Israel and the U.S. during the Cold War, when Israel first acted as a strategic 
military proxy in the satellite politics of the two Cold War superpowers.84 U.S. interests 
in the Middle East remain virtually the same today as they were during the Cold War, 
and these interests “can be summarized by access to oil, ability to deploy military forces 
in the region and denial of such capability to its rivals, and a commitment to Israel’s 
security.”85 Indeed, during the Cold War Israel helped contain Soviet expansion in the 
region, and Israel even defeated Soviet client states in regional war (Egypt and Syria), 
which required Moscow to spend more on arms in the region.86 However, furthering 
U.S. interests by supporting Israel has not been a cheap endeavor; Israel has received 
financial support from Washington that exceeds the amounts provided to any other 
state, and it is highly doubtful that Israel could have continued its high defense spending 
without economic collapse if it were not for U.S. financial support. 
Israel has been the largest recipient of U.S. direct military and economic aid 
since 1976, and Israel has been the largest cumulative recipient since WWII.87 As of 
June 2015, the U.S. had provided Israel with $124.3 billion in bilateral assistance, and 
nearly all aid to Israel has been military aid.88 Israel has received about $3 billion in aid 
per year—roughly a fifth of the entire U.S. foreign aid budget in any given year— since 
the U.S. brokered peace between Israel and Egypt at Camp David.89 This amount is 
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only expected to increase in the near future, as the Obama administration has committed 
to bolster financial support to Israel to offset the political blowback of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (commonly known as the Iranian Nuclear Deal) that was 
signed in July 2015.90 Israel’s role as a crucial partner for the U.S. during the Cold War 
undoubtedly allowed Israel to increase military expenditures above levels that would 
have been possible without U.S. aid. Israel’s unique security concerns have resulted in 
high defense spending that has been subsidized by U.S. aid, but just how high is Israeli 
defense spending and why does it matter? 
 
 
Figure 1: Terrorist Attacks Against Israel (1970-2013) 
 
Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START), Global Terrorism Database, 2013, Web, Retrieved 29 Mar 2016, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 
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The Social Costs of Israel’s Extraordinary Defense Burden 
Israeli security expenditures have been truly extraordinary, even when compared 
to other countries with high defense expenditures, and high defense spending 
contributed to an economic crisis that U.S. aid helped alleviate. On average countries 
spend about 3.4% of GDP on defense.91 The U.S. spends more on defense than any 
other country, but as a percentage of GDP, U.S. defense spending was only 4.6% in 
2014. Prior to 2010, Israeli military spending had never been below 5% of GDP and, 
today, has never been below 4% of GDP.92 As Figure 2 and Table 1 show, U.S. defense 
spending reached 10% of GDP at the height of the Vietnam War in 1968 but rapidly 
declined thereafter to an average of 6.65% from 1970-1979. These figures are high but 
not compared to Israeli defense spending during the same period. Israeli defense 
spending peaked at an unsustainable 15.2% of GDP in 1975 and averaged 13.5% of 
GDP from 1970-1979.93 It was during this period, especially after the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War, that Israeli defense spending jeopardized the overall stability of the state; 1974-
1984 is known as Israel’s lost decade economically because growth stagnated, 
government expenditures soared (mainly on defense), and inflation exceeded 400% by 
1984.94 Fortunately, the U.S. prevented the development of a major economic crisis by 
funding the1985 Economic Stabilization Plan.95 While there were certainly more broad 
global trends that contributed to Israel’s economic troubles, such as the emergence of 
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OPEC and the changing global oil landscape, Israeli defense spending certainly didn’t 
help with Israel’s economic struggles.96 The injection of U.S. aid after the peace deal 
with Egypt alleviated the burden of high defense spending somewhat, but the 1982 
Lebanon War and Israel’s military incursions in Lebanon thereafter kept defense 
spending high. Israel’s defense spending as a percentage of GDP has been 
extraordinarily high, since the 1970s, but this measure does not capture the full extent to 
which the Israeli resources have been devoted to defense.  
The domestic defense consumption measure is a more holistic measure of the 
cost of defense. The Israeli domestic defense consumption measure in Figure 2 and 
Table 3 shows the full amount of domestic resources in the Israeli economy that were 
devoted to defense in any given year. The Israeli Ministry of Defense calculates this 
measure in accordance with the most recent 2008 guidelines of the System of National 
Accounts (SNA).97 This statistic aggregates four different measures: compensation, 
defense imports, sales by the Ministry of Defense, and the purchase of goods and 
services in Israel. Compensation accounts for the salary paid to civilian and non-civilian 
employees of the defense establishment, such as conscripted soldiers, lifetime military 
members, and pensioners. The purchase of goods and services in Israel accounts for 
expenditures relating to logistical and infrastructural goods needed by the military in 
Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Defense imports measures the value of goods and 
services acquired abroad by the defense establishment, which includes the large amount 
of aid and arms given freely to Israel by the U.S. Sales by the Ministry of Defense 
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include income from selling surplus military supplies.98 Taken together, these 
expenditures paint a clearer picture of the resources devoted to defense in the Israeli 
economy.  
Figure 2: Israeli and U.S. Defense Spending (1960-2014) 
 
Sources: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Census Bureau, 
The World Bank Data Tables 
 
Table 3: Average Israeli and U.S. Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP  
(1960-2010) 






1960-1969 9.59 7.38 11.69 
1970-1979 6.65 13.47 23.98 
1980-1989 6.45 11.84 17.78 
1990-1999 4.48 7.55 9.79 
2000-2009 4.34 5.96 7.57 
1960-2010  6.23 8.91 13.53 
Sources: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Census Bureau, 
The World Bank Data Tables 
 
Figure 2 and Table 3 show downward trends from the peak defense spending 
years in the 1970’s, and this downward trend is primarily due to two factors. First, the 
large increase in the GDP of Israel over the period decreased the share of defense 
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spending in the national budget, as defense spending stayed relatively stable over the 
same time period. Figure 3 shows that per capita Israeli defense spending has stayed 
very stable since 1988, the first year in which adequate data is available for comparison. 
Second, the influx of military aid from the U.S. after the peace deal with Egypt reduced 
the domestic defense consumption measure; U.S. aid is subtracted from total 
consumption in the calculation of that measurement rather than added because the 
Israeli economy is not responsible for this input.99 U.S. military aid is significant despite 
that fact that it is not factored into the numbers in Figure 2 or Figure 3; U.S. aid has 
been said to provide a direct subsidy to each Israeli of roughly $500 per year, and 
considering that most U.S. aid to Israel is military aid, this means that the per capita 
defense spending numbers in Figure 3 and Table 4 are biased downward by a significant 
amount.100 Even though defense spending and domestic consumption have decreased 
significantly, this downward trend is somewhat misleading. 
Despite the decline in defense spending in recent decades Israel still bears the 
highest defense burden of any developed country. Figure 3 and Table 4 show that on 
average Israel has spent more per capita on defense than any other country in the world 
since 1988. The exceptions to this rule are Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE in recent 
years, but these gulf countries have had the benefit of large oil revenues, a luxury Israel 
has not had. The defense burden is a measure of the stress placed on a country’s 
economy by a high defense budget. The defense burden is a more useful measure than 
pure spending numbers, and it is even more useful than Israel’s domestic defense 
consumption, because the defense burden contextualizes defense spending in relation to 
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other countries. The global average defense burden is estimated at 2% of GDP; Israel’s 
defense burden is therefore excessive to the degree that Israel’s defense spending is 
greater than 2% of GDP.101 For example, throughout the 2000s Israeli defense spending 
averaged 5.96% of GDP. This made Israel’s defense burden 3.96% on average 
throughout the 2000’s when compared to the rest of the world. This is a considerable 
gap (remember that average defense spending worldwide is 3.4% of GDP), but it is 
much smaller than in previous decades. Given Israel’s unique security environment, an 
international comparison of the defense burden in Israel means little to many Israelis 
who will claim that it is a necessary evil in a hostile region.  
Figure 3: Military Expenditures of the Five Largest Per Capita Spenders in 
Thousands of USD (1988-2014) 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure 
Database. *Data unavailable for UAE prior to 1997. **Data on Israeli expenditures does not 
include US military aid or the cost of Operation Protective Edge for 2014 expenditures 
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Table 4: Average Defense Spending of the Five Largest Per Capita Spenders in 
Thousands of USD (1988-2014) 
Years Averaged Israel** US Saudi Arabia Oman UAE 
1990s 1616 1083 897 924 * 
2000s 1633 1596 1109 1358 1706 
1988-2014 1685 1476 1194 1407 1805 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure 
Database. *Data unavailable for UAE prior to 1997. **Data on Israeli expenditures does not 
include US military aid or the cost of Operation Protective Edge for 2014 expenditures 
 
It is true that a strong defense establishment is an absolute necessity for Israel 
given the numerous security threats facing the state, but this doesn’t change the fact that 
high defense expenditures channel economic resources away from other national 
priorities, like spending on social programs. This is a major concern for many Israelis 
outside the military establishment; in 2009 Professor Omer Moav, the chairman of the 
Israel Council of Economic Advisers, said, “The Ministry of Finance and all the 
economists who are members of the Council of Economic Advisors agree that the 
defense budget is too large for the country, and jeopardizes the Israeli economy.”102 Dr. 
Moav may have a point, as Israel ranks poorly in a number of economic indicators. The 
Social Progress Index summarizes a number of different well-being indicators into a 
comprehensive evaluation of  “the capacity of a society to meet the basic human needs 
of its citizens, establish the building blocks that allow citizens and communities to 
enhance and sustain the quality of their lives, and create the conditions for all 
individuals to reach their full potential.” Despite a relatively high GDP per capita (PPP) 
of $31,029, Israel ranks 40th on this index, just above Panama whose GDP per capita 
(PPP) is $18,793. The report explains that Israel’s performance in many categories is on 
par with top tier countries, but “Israel lags in Personal Safety, Ecosystem Sustainability, 
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and Tolerance and Inclusion.” Israel’s high poverty rates and high levels of inequality 
also lower Israel’s ranking.103 In 2013 Israel had the second highest poverty rate among 
all OECD countries and was the fourth most unequal OECD country, with a Gini 
coefficient of 0.371.104 Even if some consider high defense spending endogenous given 
Israel’s security threats, it is impossible to deny the overwhelming evidence that high 
defense spending has embattled Israel’s economy. 
 Israeli defense spending has contributed to the cycle of violence by reallocating 
capital from social welfare to security related activities, and perpetual conflict has 
imposed high costs on the Israeli and Palestinian societies despite clear evidence that 
peaceful resolution will improve the welfare of both parties significantly. In 1787, 
Thomas Paine wrote that “war involves in its progress such a train of unforeseen and 
unsupposed circumstances that no human wisdom can calculate the end.” These seem 
like strange words from the author of Common Sense, the pamphlet widely cited as 
sparking the flames of anti-British zeal that fueled the American War of 
Independence.105 However, he emphasized his disdain for the uncertainties of war by 
concluding that it “has but one thing certain and that is to increase taxes.”106 Paine was 
poignantly trying to dissuade England from going to war with Holland, and he went on 
to remind his audience that “he that goeth to war should first sit down and count the 
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cost.”107 Israel’s security concerns have made it seem as if conflict is an inevitable part 
of life, but perhaps if Israelis and Palestinians “sit down and count the cost” of the 
ongoing conflict, then they may be more disposed to pursue the benefits of peace 
despite the persistence of political disagreement.  
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Chapter 2: The Israeli Control Regime After the Oslo Accords: 
Cyclical Violence in Lieu of Peace 
 
2.1 Unrealized Peace Dividends: the Oslo Accords and the Potential Benefits of 
Peace 
 
Peace is the most preferential economic outcome for both Israelis and 
Palestinians. The Oslo Accords were the most fruitful time in which Israelis and 
Palestinians mutually recognized the need for a change in the status quo, and it seemed 
that both parties were willing to make the necessary compromises to achieve a peaceful 
resolution. The Oslo Accords were not official peace treaties; they were two separate 
agreements, signed in 1993 and 1995, which established interim governance agreements 
and a framework to facilitate final negotiations on a two-state solution between the 
State of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The Oslo Accords 
marked unprecedented progress on three fronts: Israel recognized the PLO as a 
legitimate political party representative of the Palestinian people, the PLO recognized 
the State of Israel, and both parties agreed to negotiate their differences peacefully.108 
The Oslo Accords changed the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians in many 
ways, but the economic dimension is most relevant to this study. The Oslo Accords 
briefly brought hope that a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—based 
on the “land for peace” precedent—could bring about a new age of economic 
prosperity. 
Shortly after the Six-Day War in 1967, the UN passed Resolution 242, and this 
resolution has since been the basis from which countless diplomats have attempted to 
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broker Arab-Israeli peace.109 Resolution 242 was sponsored by Britain. Resolution 242 
succeeded because it tied the main thing the Soviets and Arabs wanted — Israeli 
withdrawal from territories acquired in the 1967 Six-Day War — and the main thing 
that the U.S. and Israel wanted— recognition of Israel by neighboring Arab 
countries.110 The Oslo Accords followed the “land for peace” precedent that was 
established in theory by UN Resolution 242 and in practice by the 1979 Camp David 
Accords. 
The 1979 Camp David Accords established the “land for peace” precedent when 
Israel gave the Sinai back to Egypt in exchange for a peace treaty. The U.S. brokered 
the negotiations between Egypt and Israel after bilateral efforts proved fruitless.111 The 
U.S. promised to bolster the agreement through increased military and development aid 
to each country, and most of the aid given to both Egypt and Israel has been military 
aid.112 Opinions diverge on the relationship between the 1979 Camp David Accords and 
the Oslo peace process.113 Some consider the experience at Camp David a blueprint for 
the Oslo negotiations in 1993, while some consider the two negotiations fundamentally 
different.114 At the very least, the 1979 Camp David Accords cleared a path forward 
towards the Oslo Accords (and the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty) by creating a 
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diplomatic category whereby Arabs “could recognize Israel’s existence and physical 
presence but not yet fully accept the legitimacy of a Jewish State.”115  
Gradualism was critical to the architecture of the Oslo peace process; 
contentious issues like the final status of Jerusalem, the right of return of 1948 
Palestinian refugees, the final status of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and the 
issue of permanent borders were all left out of the text of the Oslo Accords.116 The text 
itself doesn’t even mention, let alone promise, the eventual creation of a sovereign 
Palestinian state. These omissions were certainly purposeful; both sides recognized the 
need for progress, which had been hindered in the past by diverging opinions on these 
key issues. The omission of an explicit guarantee that a Palestinian state would be 
created was not problematic for the Palestinians’ chief negotiator: Yasser Arafat. For 
Arafat, the creation of a Palestinian state was the obvious goal for all parties involved in 
negotiations, and he thought that the interim five year time period would simply be a 
time in which contentious details would be worked out.117 The signing of the first Oslo 
Accord subsided the First Intifada, a wave of violence that began in 1987, and the hope 
that briefly came with the Oslo Accords led many to speculate about the potential 
benefits of a peaceful resolution to the conflict.   
When the Oslo Accords were signed and the peace agreement between Israel 
and Jordan was formalized in 1994, many observers hoped for a substantial peace 
dividend. The term “peace dividend” gained prominence in the 1990s after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union; the absence of a second pole to oppose the U.S. allowed for a 
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substantial decrease in U.S. defense spending, which was supposed to release resources 
for more productive purposes.118 The Oslo Accords brought hope for an Israeli-
Palestinian peace dividend in which Israeli resources might be reallocated to education 
and other social areas; many even hoped that joint ventures could develop between 
Israelis, Palestinians, and Jordanians.119 A peace dividend never materialized due to 
violence in the midst of negotiations, but the brief period of hope sparked academic 
interest in the potential economic benefits of peace between Israelis and Palestinians.  
Economic studies have found that a peaceful resolution to the conflict is the best 
possible outcome for Palestinians and Israelis. In 2015, the RAND Corporation 
published the most recent and perhaps the most comprehensive study on the potential 
economic benefits of peace in the Israeli-Palestinian context.120 This study compared 
economic outcomes in Israel and the Palestinian Territories in 2024 under five different 
political outcomes for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Using present trends as the 
baseline, the study found that a two-state solution provides by far the best economic 
outcomes for both groups. When compared to present trends, Israel would gain $123 
billion over ten years under a two-state solution, while Palestinians would gain $50 
billion. However, the increase in per capita income would actually benefit the average 
Palestinian more due to the lower level of average initial income for Palestinians. Under 
a two-state solution, per capita income would increase by about 36%  ($1,100 USD) for 
Palestinians and by about 5% ($2,200 USD) for Israelis. The study also estimated the 
costs of a return to violence using current trends. Violent uprising would reduce per 
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capita GDP in the Palestinian Territories by 46% ($9.1 billion USD) and by 10% ($45 
billion USD) in Israel over the next ten years. To arrive at these estimates, the RAND 
study compared the conditions that Israelis and Palestinians experience today to the 
conditions that might occur under five alternative assumptions that are widely 
considered feasible and credible outcomes to the conflict. This counterfactual approach 
required a thorough understanding of the ways in which the nexus between Palestinian 
labor mobility, economic development, and violence has evolved since the Oslo peace 
process began in 1993. 
2.2 Cyclical Violence After the Oslo Accords and The Israeli Closure Regime 
 
The lack of a political solution to the conflict has resulted in cyclical violence 
since the best chance for peace failed to materialize during the Oslo peace process. 
Many lauded the Oslo Accords as monumental steps towards a final solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but the failure of Israelis and Palestinians to complete 
negotiations has erected more barriers than catalysts to a final peace agreement. Since 
the failure of the Oslo peace process, Palestinian violence has become more frequent 
and more decentralized, and in the eyes of many analysts the “land for peace” precedent 
is likely doomed.121 There have been numerous times of intense violence between 
Palestinians and Israelis since the Oslo peace process began in 1993; extremely violent 
episodes include suicide bombings in the midst of negotiations between 1994 and 1996, 
the Second Intifada, multiple wars against Gaza in the shadow of the 2005 Gaza 
Disengagement and the election of Hamas in 2006, and the recent uptick in Palestinian 
violence that has taken place since October 2015. Violence has been so endemic since 
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the Oslo peace process began that these labels are really only useful insofar as they 
reference periods of particularly intense conflict, and the categorization of violence into 
these periods can be somewhat misleading because it minimizes the persistent conflict 
that has afflicted Palestinians and Israelis since 1993. The Oslo peace process resulted 
in the implementation of closure policies that were designed to prevent Palestinian 
violence against Israel, but these policies have actually increased the regularity of 
Palestinian violence due to the disastrous effects that mobility restrictions have had on 
the Palestinian economies. 
The Paris Protocol 
Shortly following the initiation of the Oslo peace process in 1993, an economic 
agreement was reached between the PLO and Israel in Paris. The Protocol on Economic 
Relations between the Government of the State of Israel and the PLO, Representing the 
Palestinian People, was negotiated in Paris in 1994 and has thereby come to be known 
as the Paris Protocol.122 Reflecting the more broad Oslo process, gradualism was also 
the approach to economic issues; the Paris Protocol sought to enable the Palestinian 
economies to develop more autonomously, but without clearly establishing borders 
between the Palestinian and Israeli economies and without cutting ties altogether.  
During the negotiations, Palestinians were interested in achieving as much 
autonomy as possible, while Israeli negotiators wanted to defer as many decisions as 
possible to final status negotiations. Palestinian negotiating interests help to explain 
why some Palestinians wanted a free trade agreement (FTA); an FTA would have 
required the demarcation of economic borders, which would have conferred more 
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responsibility upon the newly created Palestinian Authority in trade matters. Israeli 
interests also help to explain why Israeli negotiators had firm instructions from Prime 
Minister Rabin to reject any notion of borders between the two economies; demarcating 
economic borders may have influenced later negotiations on political borders. In the 
final stage of negotiations, the Israelis actually did propose an FTA, but only under the 
condition that the flow of labor from the Palestinian Territories would not be as free as 
under a customs union.123 The Palestinians were therefore faced with a dilemma: the 
greater their autonomy over trade issues, the lesser their potential for employment in the 
preferential Israeli labor market. Underlying this dilemma is the deeper dilemma that 
persists for the Palestinians: greater levels of political autonomy will likely worsen 
economic conditions, while sacrificing autonomy for integration and cooperation with 
Israel keeps economic conditions more favorable than the alternative. With these 
dilemmas in mind, the Palestinians opted for a customs union. The effect of the Paris 
Protocol was to formalize the de facto customs union between Israel and the Palestinian 
Territories that had persisted since 1967, though there were changes that conferred more 
responsibility to the newly created PA. 
The issue of labor flows was addressed in Article VII of the Protocol. The first 
paragraph of this article states that “both sides will attempt to maintain the normality of 
movement of labour between them,” but a stipulation was added that each side had the 
“right to determine from time to time the extent and conditions of its labour movement 
into its area.”124 While no official number was provided in the Protocol, “the implicit 
intention of the Israeli side was to have 70-100 thousand Palestinians working in 
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Israel,” and any interruption of labor flows was supposed to be “transitory and brief.”125 
Violence in the midst of the Oslo peace process kept hopes for a more prosperous, more 
autonomous Palestinian economy from materializing as Israel increased restrictions on 
“labour movement into its area” for the Palestinians. 
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2.3 Restricting Palestinian Mobility as Counter-Insurgency: The Oslo Accords, 
The Second Intifada, and Israel’s Use of Closure Policies  
 
As Figure 5 shows, Palestinian labor flows to Israel have become much more 
erratic since the Oslo peace process began in 1993. In the twenty years between 1967 
and 1987, the number of Palestinians working in Israel grew steadily. However, the 
number of Palestinians working in Israel decreased during the Oslo peace process from 
115,600 in 1992 to roughly 63,000 in 1996. The number of Palestinians working in 
Israel began to increase once again after 1997, but this number reached its post-Oslo 
peak of approximately 110,000 Palestinian workers in 2000, only to be reduced to less 
than 35,800 Palestinian workers by 2002 in the midst of the Second Intifada.126 The 
main cause for the fluctuation of Palestinian labor in Israel was the new Israeli policy to 
control Palestinian movement as a counter-insurgency measure; the Palestinian 
economies were striving to become more autonomous after the negotiation of the Paris 
Protocol, and the stipulation in the Paris Protocol that both Israelis and Palestinians 
could regulate labor flows helped codify Israel’s security justifications for border 
closures during times of violence between 1993 and 1996 as well as between 2000 and 
2005.   
Controlling labor flows required the creation of an intricate security 
infrastructure, which was mostly a reflection of the security concerns that precipitated 
throughout the 1990s. In the 1970s and 1980s there were only minor barriers for 
Palestinians to gain access to the Israeli labor market, but following the 1991 Gulf War 
Israel required all Palestinians seeking work in Israel to have a permit.127 These permits 
required Palestinians to be 28 years or older, to acquire a request of employment from 
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an Israeli employer, and to obtain a security clearance from the military establishment. 
The enforcement of these new rules grew stricter as time went on, and following the 
series of terrorist attacks associated with Yahiya Ayyash between 1993 and 1996, Israel 
instituted a closure policy in which roadblocks were set up on major transportation 
routes.128 These barriers barred entry into Israel from Palestinian areas along main 
transportation arteries. There were also situations of internal closure. In these instances 
Israel prevented movement within the West Bank itself, which not only prevented labor 
flows to Israel but also disrupted normal economic activity within the West Bank. As 
long as closures were in effect, all work permits were suspended, and the flow of all 
goods were frozen.129 Between 1993-2000, Israel closed its borders with the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip for 484 effective days, which is the equivalent of nearly three 
months of closures per year.130  
In Israel, the frequency of closures injected uncertainty into the local labor 
markets that prominently featured Palestinian workers, but the substitution of overseas 
foreigners minimized disruption to normal economic activities.131 The percentage of 
Palestinians comprising the total labor force in Israel dropped from 8% in the 1980s to 
less than 1% in 2000. The percentage of foreign workers in Israel rose from less than 
1% to approximately 12% during that same period.132 In terms of the actual number of 
workers, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics estimates that there were very few 
foreign workers in Israel prior to 1993 (when the closure policy began to be strictly 
                                                 
128 Leila Farsarkh, “Palestinian Labor Migration to Israel Since Oslo and Beyond,” Topics in Middle 
Eastern and North African Economies, Vol. 4, (2002). 
129 Ibid. 
130 UNSCO. The Impact on the Palestinian Economy of the Recent Confrontations, Mobility Restriction 
and Border Closures, 1 October 2000-31 January 2001, Jerusalem, (2001).  
131 Arnon And Weinblatt, “Sovereignty And Economic Development,” 297 
132 Israel Drori, Foreign Workers in Israel: Global Perspectives, State University of New York Press, 
Albany, NY, (2009): 8.  
 50 
enforced). In 1991, there were only 8,000 overseas foreign workers in Israel.133 By 
1994, this number had grown eight-fold to approximately 65,000 and by 1995 this 
number doubled once again to approximately 120,000. The substitution of Palestinian 
laborers with foreigners allowed Israel to implement closure policies with minimal 
interruption to Israeli economic activities, which was important during the Second 
Intifada. 
 The Second Intifada, sometimes called the Al-Aqsa Intifada, was a period of 
intense violence that claimed the lives of more than 3,300 Palestinians and more than 
1,000 Israelis between November 2000 and August 2005.134 The violence began after 
Ariel Sharon, the opposition leader in the Israeli government and an opponent of 
Palestinian statehood, made a heavily escorted visit to the Temple Mount in 
Jerusalem.135 Palestinians viewed this visit to the third most holy site in Islam as a 
political provocation, and the following day a large group of Palestinian protestors 
gathered to confront the Israeli police on the Temple Mount. Violence between the 
Palestinian protestors and Israeli security forces ensued. According to the Israeli 
government there were fourteen policemen injured in these clashes.136 The U.S. 
Department of State found that Israeli security forces “used rubber bullets and live 
ammunition to disperse the protestors, killing four people and injuring about 400.”137 A 
series of confrontations between Israeli security personnel and Palestinian protesters 
followed this initial incident, and these clashes quickly evolved into a wider variety of 
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violent Palestinian resistance and Israeli responses.138 Strong evidence has emerged 
after the Second Intifada that Israel reacted strongly to Palestinian violence by taking 
counter-insurgency measures designed to limit Palestinian violence, and these measures 
were somewhat effective in reducing the magnitude of violence.139 
Scaling up restrictions on the movement of Palestinian labor and goods was one 
of the major counter-insurgency measures implemented by Israel during the Second 
Intifada, especially after 2002. In the spring of 2002, Israel initiated “Operation 
Defensive Shield,” which was “a large-scale military offensive against the Palestinian 
militant and terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank” that included internal closures of 
West Bank transportation routes.140 This resulted in intense fighting in the West Bank 
between the IDF and the Palestinians, and eventually international pressure led Israel to 
end the operation on May 10, 2002. However, “Operation Determined Path” began in 
June 2002 in response to continued suicide bombings inside Israel; the IDF met much 
less resistance from the Palestinians, and the IDF has maintained its presence and its 
security infrastructure in the West Bank ever since.141 
 2002 was also the year in which Israel began construction on the controversial 
Separation Barrier, which has the declared intent to restrict Palestinian access to Israel 
for security reasons.142 Since construction began in the rural areas of the northern West 
Bank, the Barrier has slowly progressed towards the most profound transformation of 
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the Palestinian landscape since the 1967 Six-Day War.143 The Barrier consists of 
concrete slabs reaching approximately 25 feet in height, ditches, watchtowers, electric 
fences, security checkpoints, and militarized patrol roads along the fence.144 The 
Separation Barrier has been highly criticized for reasons beyond economics; in the first 
phase of the wall alone 58 communities with more than 170,000 Palestinians were 
either trapped between the Green Line and the Barrier, encircled by 25 foot-tall wall 
segments, or physically separated from their lands and agricultural livelihoods.145 
Despite criticisms, the Barrier and Israel’s closure policies have been credited with 
reducing the massive amounts of violence that plagued Israel in the early stages of the 
Intifada; unfortunately the increased cost and difficulty of travel for Palestinians who 
work in Israel has contributed to a cycle of violence by exacerbating unemployment, 
thereby lowering the opportunity cost of violence for Palestinians.146  
The number of overseas foreigners working in Israel stayed relatively high 
throughout the Second Intifada, while the number of Palestinians working in Israel 
declined significantly. The number of overseas foreign workers in Israel peaked in 2002 
at 240,000 but subsequently fell to 180,000 by 2004.147 This was the same year that the 
number of West Bank Palestinians working in Israel reached an all-time low of 35,800 
workers and the West Bank Palestinian unemployment rate peaked at 28.2%.148 
Between the beginning of 1999 and the end of 2004, the average number of foreign 
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workers in Israel was 203,500, but this can be broken down into 131,500 illegal foreign 
workers and 72,000 legal foreign workers.149  
Over this same period there were 80,140 two-year work permits given to foreign 
laborers per year (with a standard deviation of 12, 370); the high number of illegal 
foreign workers indicates that the risk for deportation was relatively low for foreigners 
who stayed in Israel after their two-year permit had expired.150 This low-deportation 
risk indicates that non-Israeli labor is not necessarily problematic in Israel (Israel has 
actually grown highly dependent on foreign labor in a number of different sectors), but 
rather Palestinian labor became problematic during the 1990s and 2000s because 
Palestinians became associated with the violence that plagued Israel in the Post-Oslo 
period. The substitution of overseas foreign workers allowed Israel to implement large-
scale restrictions on Palestinian movement as a counter-insurgency tactic without 
causing a major disruption to Israeli economic activities. 
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2.4 Unemployment and Violence After the Imposition of Mobility Restrictions  
 
The Israeli closure policy— both within the West Bank and between Israel and 
the Palestinian Territories—contributed to erratic and unusually high unemployment 
rates in the Palestinian Territories between 1993 and 2007. Unemployment rates in this 
era ranged from 15-37% in the Gaza Strip and from 10-28% in the West Bank. These 
rates are alarmingly high when compared with the 1970-1993 period; unemployment 
remained below 7% in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the entire 
period.151 These high levels of unemployment are almost entirely attributed to the 
increase of restrictions on Palestinian mobility, especially internal restrictions of 
movement within the West Bank.152 In 2007, internal closures were estimated to have 
cost the West Bank economy approximately $223 million (USD), or 6% of West Bank 
GDP for that year.153 In 2015, Adnan calculated a lower bound estimate of the 
economic cost of a 50-day increase in the number of border closures per quarter, and he 
found the cost for the West Bank is about $1.7 million (USD) per day in the subsequent 
quarter due to increased unemployment.154  Figure 4 presents graphical evidence that a 
high degree of correlation exists between comprehensive closure days and 
unemployment rates among Palestinians in the West Bank, particularly during the 
Second Intifada. Unfortunately, studies have shown that border closures contribute to 
Palestinian terrorism by lowering the opportunity cost of violence, and border closures 
actually increase the quality of Palestinian terrorism as economic conditions worsen.  
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Bueno de Mesquita suggested that economic conditions might be correlated with 
the quality of terrorist attacks in 2005.155 According to his rationale, individuals have 
the choice to work in the market economy or to carry out terror attacks, and rational 
individuals will only choose terror if that brings them more utility than working in the 
market economy. If this is indeed the case, then low-ability individuals will be more 
likely to join terrorist organizations when economic conditions are good because they 
will have trouble finding a job. This also implies that worsening economic conditions 
should make it easier for terrorist organizations to recruit better-educated and more able 
people. In short, worsening economic conditions should improve the overall quality of 
terror attacks, because terror organizations can choose better-qualified individuals to 
carry out operations.  
In 2012, Esteban Klor (the chair of the Depart of Economics at the Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem) found that Bueno de Mesquita’s theory is true in the Israeli-
Palestinian context.  He analyzed the Second Intifada and found that higher 
unemployment rates in one quarter increased the average educational attainment and 
age of Palestinian suicide bombers in the following quarter during the Second Intifada. 
Additionally, Klor found that a standard deviation increase in unemployment “induces a 
17.6% increase in the probability that the targeted city has a large population” relative 
to the mean population size of cities targeted by terrorist attacks. This is consistent with 
earlier research; in 2007 Benmelech and Berrebi found that higher-quality terrorists 
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cause more fatalities and are less likely to be stopped by security forces.156 The 
correlation between economic development and the quality of terror attacks has 
important implications for the peace process, especially concerning the effectiveness of 
foreign aid.  
The challenges that employment uncertainties and violence posed for the 
Palestinian economies between 1993 and 2007 was partially offset by the massive 
amounts of international aid flowing into the Palestinian Territories; rather than 
providing the fuel behind economic growth and Palestinian state-building, foreign aid 
acted as more of an insurance policy against the macroeconomic shocks that resulted 
from violent conflict during the Oslo Peace Process and during the Second Intifada.157 It 
was hoped that the peace process would result in rising domestic investment and an 
influx of foreign investment in the Palestinian Territories. Indeed, more than $7 billion 
USD was dispersed in the Palestinian Territories between 1993 and 2005.158 The rise in 
investment should have stimulated industrial growth and thereby facilitated a rise in 
local Palestinian employment, which would have reduced reliance on the Israeli labor 
market. This would have led labor-intensive, value-added Palestinian exports to 
eventually replace the flow of Palestinian labor to the Israeli labor market.159 
Unfortunately, aid to the Palestinian Territories has mostly been dedicated to emergency 
relief rather than state-building and economic growth, and as a result, the Palestinian 
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economy has remained dependent on Palestinian labor in the Israeli labor market 
despite the volatility of labor flows that emerged during the Oslo peace process.160  
In the Post-Oslo period Palestinians have been neither sovereign nor integrated, 
neither moving towards one state nor two, but perpetually contained through a complex 
security infrastructure that prevents the development of a Palestinian state even as Israel 
governments publically commit to a two-state resolution to the conflict.161 This cyclical 
violence has understandably made peace seem impossible, but research on the 
connection between economic development and violence suggests that the integration of 
more West Bank Palestinian laborers into the Israeli labor market might reduce 
violence. Nearly all studies have come to the conclusion that increased labor mobility 
will have positive effects for the Palestinian economy, but no studies exist that quantify 
the benefits of increased labor mobility or the consequences of increased mobility 
restrictions given the current state of affairs in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such a 
policy is certainly a gamble. The following chapter will seek to estimate the impact of 
integrating more Palestinians into the Israeli labor force, and it is expected that such a 
policy may forge a more peaceful path towards political negotiations.
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Table 5: Number of Border Closures Imposed on the Palestinian Territories  
(1993-2000) 











1993 26 9 17 6.13% 
1994 89 25 64 23.1% 
1995 112 28.5 83.5 29.93% 
1996 121 31.5 89.5 31.91% 
1997 79 22 57 20.54% 
1998 26 11.5 14.5 5.21% 
1999 16 9 7 2.53% 
2000 75 23 52 18.81% 
Source: UNSCO. The Impact on the Palestinian Economy of the Recent Confrontations, Mobility 
Restriction and Border Closures, 1 October 2000-31 January 2001, Jerusalem, (2001). 
 
Figure 4: Comprehensive Border Closure Days and Unemployment in the West 
Bank (1995-2015) 
 
Notes and Sources: Comprehensive Closure Days in this graph does not take holidays and weekends into 
account, as is the case in Table 2. Comprehensive Closure Days were taken from the website of Israeli 
human rights group B’tselem: http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/siege_figures 
and UNSCO. The Impact on the Palestinian Economy of the Recent Confrontations, Mobility Restriction 
and Border Closures, 1 October 2000-31 January 2001, Jerusalem, (2001). Unemployment rates were 
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Table 6: Average Number of Palestinians Working in Israel and Average 
Percentage of Palestinian Labor Force Working in Israel by Decade (1970-2014) 
Years Averaged West Bank 
Palestinians 
West Bank 













































Notes and Sources: Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. All numbers before 2000 are 
derived from various issues of the Statistical Abstract of Israel from the Israeli Central Bureau of 
Statistics. All numbers after 1999 are derived from various issues of the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics' Palestinian Labor Force Survey. Numbers for the West Bank exclude East Jerusalem between 
1968-93, but include East Jerusalem thereafter. 1994 figures are not available. Numbers include the 
underemployed but do not include unemployed. Rounding may cause summation errors. 
 
Figure 5: Palestinian Labor in Israel (1970-2014) 
 
Notes and Sources: All numbers before 2000 are derived from various issues of the Statistical Abstract 
of Israel from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. All numbers after 1999 are derived from various 
issues of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics' Palestinian Labor Force Survey. Numbers for the 
West Bank exclude East Jerusalem between 1968-93, but include East Jerusalem thereafter. 1994 figures 
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Figure 6: Palestinian Labor in Israel (1997-2007) 
 
Notes and Sources: All numbers before 2000 are derived from various issues of the Statistical Abstract 
of Israel from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. All numbers after 1999 are derived from various 
issues of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics' Palestinian Labor Force Survey. Numbers for the 
West Bank exclude East Jerusalem between 1968-93, but include East Jerusalem thereafter. 1994 figures 
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Chapter 3: Modeling the Effects of Integrating More Palestinians into 
the Israeli Labor Market 
 
In March 2016 the Israeli Knesset passed a bill that increased the penalty for 
Israeli employers who hire Palestinian workers illegally. According to the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics, there were 35,900 Palestinians working in Israel without a 
permit as of September 2015.162 The new piece of legislation made hiring these 
Palestinian workers a felony for Israeli employers, and repeat offenders can now be hit 
with a 226,000 NIS fine and a four-year prison sentence.163 This harsher punishment 
came only one month after the Security Cabinet approved a plan to increase the number 
of work permits given to West Bank Palestinians by 30,000.164 Interestingly, these 
juxtaposed pieces of legislation both had the same goal: reduce the high rate of violence 
that has persisted since October 2015. One on hand, the military establishment 
recognizes that Palestinian labor in Israel is crucial to the economy of the West Bank 
and that increasing the number of Palestinians with permits may reduce violence 
through economic development. On the other, the presence of illegal workers poses a 
security threat because they are not subject to the formal security process of obtaining a 
permit. In both cases, the presence of West Bank Palestinians is seen as a security issue 
by Israeli authorities due to the history of violence in the conflict. 
 The agent-based dynamic equilibrium model in this chapter analyzes the effects 
of allowing more West Bank Palestinian Laborers (henceforth WBPL) to work in Israel 
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given the current state of affairs in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. My results show that 
Israel should not impose border closures on Palestinians with work permits unless the 
rate of violence reaches 4.2 fatalities per day over a given period of time, and Israeli 
economic production will not be reduced by violence even if Israel doubles the number 
of West Bank Palestinians working in Israel to above 200,000.  
3.1 Commuters or Migrants? The Unique Case of Palestinians Working in Israel 
 
Palestinian laborers working in Israel have been both migrants and commuters 
since partial integration of the two economies began post-1967; however the 
experiences of Palestinians working in Israel are more similar to that of migrants due to 
the wage differentials between Israel and the Palestinian Territories, the cultural 
differences and racial tensions experienced by Arabs in Israel, and the checkpoint 
system established after the failure of the Oslo Accords. Palestinians will therefor be 
classified as migrants in this analysis despite the fact that they commute to work. This 
connects the evaluation of Palestinian labor in Israel in this chapter to the broader field 
focusing on the effects of migration on economic development. Despite the conditions 
that make work in Israel more attractive, Palestinian migrants to the Israeli labor market 
are considered to be migrating by choice, whereas many migrants are forcefully 
displaced (as has been the case in the recent Syrian migrant crisis).165 The issue of 
Palestinian labor in Israel is analyzed in this section according to how it relates to 
macroeconomic and microeconomic theories of migration, and Palestinian labor in 
Israel is most pertinent to the recent literature concerning the security issues associated 
with migration in the post-9/11 era of global terrorism.  
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The first Age of Mass Migration (1870-1910) spurred some of the earliest 
studies on migration, including German-born geographer E.G. Ravenstein’s series of 
seminal papers entitled “The Laws of Migration.”166 His studies sought to explain 
migration as completely as possible, though he admitted that this goal might have been 
too ambitious because “the laws of population, and economic laws generally, have not 
the rigidity of physical laws.”167 Today there exists a wide array of research on 
migratory issues within the economic literature, and migration economics is a growing 
subfield of economic study. As the study of migration economics has progressed, 
Ravenstein’s observation has proven to be astute; studies on migration have reached 
many different conclusions on the determinants and effects of migration.  
 Modern research on migration and economic development has indeed grown to 
be quite prolific, but a single coherent theory of international migration has remained 
elusive. This is primarily due to the fact that migration is a complex issue that cannot be 
analyzed without incorporating a variety of disciplines, levels of analysis, and 
assumptions. Considering the fact that different approaches conceptualize causal 
processes at different levels of analysis — the individual, the household, the national, 
the international — different theories cannot necessarily be considered inherently 
incompatible.168 It is therefore useful to consider how the established economic models 
of migration relate to the economic and security concerns that the movement of 
Palestinians invokes among many Israelis. 
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 Some of the oldest and most well known theories on international migration are 
neoclassical theories that were originally developed to explain labor migration in the 
process of economic development.169 From a macroeconomic perspective, international 
migration is caused by the very same factors that drive internal migration within a 
country, namely the geographic differences in the supply and demand of labor (which 
dictates wages). From the macro perspective, labor and capital moves from areas of 
excess to areas lacking one or both of these resources in response to wage differentials 
and in response to differences in the rate of return to human capital. This perspective 
explains why Palestinians wanted to work in Israel after 1967; labor moves to where it 
will be most productive and therefore most financially rewarding. 
 As was the case in section three of chapter one, macroeconomic explanations 
execute analysis at the international or national levels with the assumption that the 
international labor system naturally moves towards equilibrium. As a result, this model 
is typically a better predictor of the demand for labor migration in host countries than 
actual migratory flows.170 This is consistent in the Israeli-Palestinian case, because it is 
not immediately clear why more Palestinians aren’t working in Israel if you simply look 
at the wage differentials and understand nothing about the politics and the history of 
violence between the two peoples. The macro perspective does not fully consider the 
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implications of the political economy of migration, and in many cases the decision-
making processes of individuals who choose to migrate are not well modeled.171  
From a microeconomic perspective, individual rational actors decide to migrate 
based on a cost-benefit analysis that leads them to believe that migration will yield a net 
return (typically in monetary terms) from movement.172 In this model, people choose to 
move where they can be the most productive given their skills, but they must factor in 
all the costs of migration to determine whether or not the increased wages will outweigh 
the costs of migration. These costs are both monetary and intangible, and immigrants 
choose to migrate to international locations that have the best net future returns for their 
skills. Evaluating a Palestinian’s decision to sneak into Israel without a permit would be 
an example of a microeconomic analysis of a decision-making process in the Israeli-
Palestinian context. If caught, there are consequences (costs) for Palestinians who 
choose to obviate the formal permit and checkpoint system that regulates who is granted 
access to work and travel in Israel, but the large number of Palestinians working 
illegally in Israel in recent decades suggests that these costs are worth the risk for many 
Palestinians.173 While the micro perspective models individual decision making 
processes quite well, this limits the scope of analysis to individual situations and works 
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much better as an ex post explanatory model than a predictive model of future 
migration. 
In response to the politicization of migration in recent decades, some economists 
have focused their studies on the impacts of immigration on the labor market and 
overall economic performance of the receiving country,174 and some have tried to 
determine if a certain type of people are likely to choose to migrate.175 These studies 
begin with the assumption that migration increases the supply of labor in a particular 
area, which would increase competition in the local labor market and reduce the wages 
and numbers of employment opportunities for citizens of the migrant-receiving country. 
However, most studies have found that migrants typically do not have a negative effect 
on the labor market opportunities for citizens.176 This has been the case in the Israeli-
Palestinian context. Furthermore, most studies agree that the number of Palestinians 
working in Israel should be increased.177 While many studies have concluded that 
migrants do not negatively affect the labor market opportunities for citizens, the 
literature concerning how migration may be affecting global economic output is not yet 
conclusive.  
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Recent literature has estimated that international barriers to migration restrict 
efficiency in the global labor market, which hinders poverty reduction and reduces 
global production to fractions of the potential production levels if more spatially 
optimized labor allocation could be achieved. This literature has observed that the free 
movement of goods and capital in the post-WWII era has not necessarily brought about 
the convergence between the living standards of rich countries and poor countries for 
which the traditional development agenda has hoped.178 This does not mean that 
development outcomes have not improved since WWII in many places around the 
world, but this literature argues that allowing people to move from low-productivity 
places to high-productivity places is the most efficient policy tool for poverty reduction. 
Economist Michael Clemens has argued that a modest liberalization of current 
international migration laws would result in a net increase in global production by about 
one trillion dollars per year.179 Unfortunately this research is relatively recent, and the 
liberalization of migration restrictions for which this literature argues remains highly 
unlikely given the current political economy of migration in most countries around the 
world. 
In response to the efficiency literature on migration, some recent studies have 
sought to formalize anti-immigration discourse by arguing that migrants from poor 
countries carry with them the cultures and institutions that make their home country 
poor. In this model, global productivity is actually preserved by migration restrictions 
because migrants from poor countries carry with them whatever cultural or institutional 
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factors make their home country poor. This is an old argument that has been put forth 
academically at least as far back as Julius Isaac in 1947 and as recently as Martin Wolf 
in 2015, but the argument that global efficiency gains would be offset is somewhat 
new.180 These studies form the epidemiological case for migration restrictions; they 
posit that low productivity is something that spreads (like disease or pollution) and if 
enough low productivity is transmitted from poor countries to rich countries through 
migrants, then the efficiency gains from labor reallocation will be offset. However, the 
literature is inconclusive on the validity of this theory, and if this causal mechanism 
exists, it is difficult to determine to what extent immeasurable variables like culture 
influence productivity or economic development.181 It is not impossible to rule out the 
epidemiological case for migration restrictions altogether, and unfortunately the 
dialogue concerning refugees and migrants from Muslim countries has reflected this 
argument in recent years.  
Migration has been a security issue for quite some time now, at least in the 
United States and certainly in Israel, but the rise of militant Islamist groups has thrust 
security issues to the forefront of migration discussions, especially since 9/11. During 
the Cold War era, the West saw the Soviet Union as the source of terror and global 
instability, but in light of the end of the Cold War and the post 9/11 instability, militant 
Islamist networks like the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and most recently ISIS have become the 
focus of international security efforts. As was discussed in section four of chapter one, 
these fears are not unfounded. It is true that numerous attacks carried out by Islamist 
                                                 
180 Julius Isaac, Economics Of Migration, Routledge, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., London, UK, (1947): 
110-140. Martin Wolf, “The Benefits Of Migration Are Questionable: Cosmopolitanism Is Incompatible 
With Our Organization Into Territorial Jurisdictions,” Financial Times, 2015, September 29. 
181 Michael A. Clemens and Lant Pritchett, “The New Economic Case For Migration Restrictions: An 
Assessment,” NYU Development Research Institute: Working Paper No. 100, (January 2016). 
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groups have caused devastating losses, but public backlash to such attacks is still very 
troubling.  
Studies have found that perceived external threats typically result in an 
increased sense of nationalism or other forms of in-group solidarity, vilification of the 
perceived source of the threat, limitations on government actions that may 
support/protect members of the threatening group, and increased support for belligerent 
actions directed at the members of the threatening group.182 These responses have been 
evident in the post 9/11 era, and such backlash has important consequences not only for 
members of Muslim communities around the world but also for the rights and freedoms 
of any person who may be perceived as a part of a threatening group in the future.183 
Given the evolving nexus between migration, economics, and security, the recent 
decision to increase the number of Palestinians working in Israel by 30,000 warrants a 
closer look at what the possible side effects of this policy may be. 
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3.2 Why An Agent-Based Dynamic Equilibrium Model? 
 
The agent-based economic model employed in this study models Israeli-
Palestinian production as a function of violence, which is an inherently social 
phenomenon. Agent-based economic models seek to analyze the intricate two-way 
feedback between microstructure and macrostructure that has been recognized within 
economics for quite some time.184 Agent-based modelers achieve this by analyzing 
economies as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents. This requires the 
modeler to construct an economy with an initial population of agents that are expected 
to act in a limited number of ways given the environment in which they operate. This 
approach is particularly powerful because it allows researchers to investigate how large-
scale effects arise from the micro-level interactions of agents—after starting from an 
initial set of conditions— such as the current state of affairs in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.185  
The agent-based model in this study is an adaptation of the economic model 
found in “The New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions: An Assessment,” by 
Michael Clemens and Lant Pritchett.186 In their paper, Clemens and Pritchett assess a 
relatively recent argument in economic research known as the new economic case for 
migration restrictions. This theory suggests that migration restrictions might be 
preserving the efficiency of the global labor market by preventing mass redistribution of 
the global population. This theory assumes that without tight restrictions on migration, 
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migrants from poor countries may transmit low productivity (measured as Total Factor 
Productivity) to rich countries. If this were the case, mass migration would offset the 
efficiency gains from the spatial reallocation of labor from low to high-productivity 
places. 
 To evaluate whether or not migrants bring their productivity determinants with 
them, their paper proposes a model of dynamically efficient migration using three 
parameters: transmission, assimilation, and congestion. Transmission measures the 
degree to which origin country Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is embodied in 
migrants, assimilation measures the degree to which the productivity determinants of 
migrants become like the productivity determinants of citizens of the home country over 
time, and congestion measures the degree to which transmission and assimilation 
change according to the number of migrants in the host country. Their paper finds that 
the current evidence about these parameters points to a relaxation of international 
migration restrictions in all scenarios.  
Clemens and Pritchett analyze the effects of migration on cumulative production 
between a home country and a migrant-sending country; in the same manner, this study 
analyzes cumulative production between Israel and the West Bank, but in the Israeli-
Palestinian context the primary concern is not that Palestinians from the West Bank will 
bring low productivity to Israel. The concern for many Israelis is that more freedom of 
Palestinian movement will bring more violence upon Israel. Clemens and Pritchett 
acknowledge that the three parameters in their model are somewhat unknown and may 
be influenced by a variety of factors, some of which they examine. However, in their 
analysis they don’t take into account that increased immigration could lead to more 
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crime and/or more violence. Crime perpetrated by immigrants, especially violent crime, 
may lower TFP in the migrant-receiving country by eroding trust within society. They 
likely omitted this variable because migrants are less likely to commit crime or engage 
in violence in most cases, but this omission might also be due to the fact that migrants 
rarely want to move into an area of conflict.187  
Clemens and Pritchett’s acknowledgement that the parameters in their model 
can be influenced by a variety of factors, when combined with the absence of an 
evaluation of crime and/or violence in their study, makes their economic model 
adaptable to the Israeli-Palestinian context yet incomplete for the particular factors at 
play in this context. The intimate proximity of Israelis and Palestinians and the 
commuter/migrant nature of WBPL require my model to consider social interactions 
more deeply than did Clemens and Pritchett while analyzing the effects of violence on 
TFP.  
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3.3 Assumptions, Parameters, and Reasoning 
 
The economic model in this study analyzes the nexus between labor mobility, 
economic development, and violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by incorporating 
the available research on these key issues. Rather than assessing the degree to which 
Palestinian workers affect the efficiency of the Israeli-Palestinian labor market, this 
model analyzes the degree to which TFP may decrease as a result of violence. The 
model accomplishes this by analyzing how the recommended number of WBPL 
permitted to work in Israel changes at different rates of violence. At its core, this model 
is concerned with the evolution of violence as a social-behavioral norm given an 
increase in the number of WBPL permitted to work in Israel, but this evolution of 
social-behavioral norms is modeled with respect to the effect of violence on economic 
productivity.  
The assumptions for the agents in this model are as follows: 
1. The conflict has high economic costs (in terms of expenditures and in terms of 
unrealized potential growth) for Israelis and Palestinians due to the negative 
effects of violence on economic development.188 
2. Palestinian violence against Israel is correlated with economic development 
(violence increases as economic conditions worsen).189 
3. Israel’s labor restrictive policies harm the Palestinian economies by increasing 
unemployment, which has been correlated with increased violence.190 
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4. Allowing more WBPL to work in Israel will benefit the West Bank economy 
through increased capital availability and will benefit the Israeli economy 
through increased production. Both groups would benefit from reduced 
violence.191  
5. Permitting more WBPL to work in Israel and allowing for more freedom of 
movement within the West Bank can increase support for conciliatory 
measures.192 
6. A partial relaxation of Israel’s control over Palestinian mobility is politically 
feasible.193 
7. The perception that peace may be possible results in increased economic growth 
through increased investments and lower rates of destruction of human and 
physical capital by violence.194 
8. Every day interactions between Palestinians and Israelis, when they occur under 
optimal conditions, have the potential to reduce the perception that members of 
the other group are a threat and therefore increase support for peace.195 
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These assumptions form the initial set of conditions of the Israeli and West Bank 
economies in the model, and these assumptions are informed by a plethora of scholarly 
research beyond even the previous chapters in this study and the cited material. 
However, it is important to consider the full range of possibilities when analyzing the 
effects of increasing the number of WBPL working in Israel. Therefore this model 
relates these assumptions—and their counter-arguments—through three parameters of 
social behavior: 
• Propensity for Violence (v) - the degree to which increased freedom of 
movement for Palestinians leads to increased violence. More freedom of 
movement for Palestinians would increase the number of interactions between 
the two groups of people, which may produce more violence depending on 
(among other things) the attitudes of Israelis and Palestinians towards each 
other. Higher levels of violence would lower economic output in the short term 
by decreasing the TFP associated with trust between the two groups. 
• Pacification (n)- the degree to which Palestinians reduce their propensity for 
violence over time due to the positive effects of economic development in the 
West Bank and the degree to which Israelis reduce their perception of 
Palestinians as threatening due to the positive influence of high quality 
interactions. Put simply, this measures the level of trust between the two groups. 
This measure is embodied in Palestinians, as their economic development and 
the interactions that are produced by their increased freedom of movement are 
the primary determinants of intergroup perceptions and the propensity for 
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violence. Relations between the two groups pacify more quickly at lower levels 
of violence. 
• Agitation (r)- the degree to which the positive effects of economic development 
and peaceful interactions are diminished by violence between Palestinians and 
Israeli military personnel or other Israelis (during the commute to work or in 
other daily activities). This also accounts for the influence of highly 
ideologically motivated Palestinians who remain committed to violent revolt 
despite the impacts of economic development, and also accounts for the 
influences of the community in which individual Palestinian laborers live, as 
certain areas of the West Bank are more or less likely to support violence against 
Israel.  
These parameters differentially affect the total output of the Israeli and West 
Bank economies by increasing or decreasing TFP, which is a function of violence in the 
model. They also affect the number of WBPL that should be permitted to work in Israel. 
I seek to find the number of WBPL that should be allowed to work in Israel given 
different values for these three parameters.  
Allowing Palestinians to work in Israel increases overall Israeli-Palestinian 
production by reallocating labor from low-to-high marginal product of labor, and 
allowing more Palestinians to work in Israel produces better economic development 
outcomes in the West Bank through increased wages, which should lead to a reduction 
in violence. However, it is important to consider Israeli concerns that giving 
Palestinians more freedom of movement might lead to more violence, which would 
lower economic output. More importantly, if giving Palestinians more freedom of 
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movement truly is a security risk, then the resulting lower economic output is not the 
primary concern. The potential for the destruction of capital, or even more, the potential 
for loss of human life, is much more worrisome. The model in this study is therefore of 
significant importance, because it will illuminate whether integrating more WBPL into 
the Israeli labor force is more likely to result in increased violence or more likely to 
interrupt the established cycle of violence through economic development. 
Before jumping into the mathematics it is important to understand how the 
model functions as an agent-based model of social interaction, which should make the 
connection between economic development, violence, and production more clear. After 
this is understood, the mathematical model will be explained intuitively with reminders 
of how the previously explained assumptions and parameters relate to each other in the 
equations. Finally, the model will be used to estimate how many WBPL can be 
permitted to work in Israel (without reducing Israeli TFP) given different vales for the 
three parameters.  
3.4 Towards an Economic Model of Social Interaction 
 
The General Aggression Model (GAM) explains how economic development 
can reduce violence by altering the social interactions between Israelis and Palestinians. 
The GAM has been in use since 1995 when Dr.’s Craig Anderson, William Deuser, and 
Kristina DeNeve formulated it to analyze the correlation between high temperatures and 
violence, and it has since been used to explain the cognitive processes behind many 
different types of aggression and violence.196 Dr. Anderson of Iowa State University 
and Dr. Brad J. Bushman of Ohio State University have championed much of the 
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 78 
research that utilizes the GAM.197 The GAM integrates a wide variety of psychological 
and sociological theories into a single framework for understanding human aggression 
and violence.198 This has established the GAM as a framework for scholars to test 
hypotheses of aggression and violence that is “more expansive than any other social-
cognitive model.”199 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is cited as an example of a cycle of 
violence according to the GAM.  
According to the GAM, breaking the violence escalation cycle in the Israeli-
Palestinian context “would begin by encouraging citizens of Israel, Palestine, or both 
countries to perceive that the outcome of their country’s retaliation is both important 
and unsatisfying.” Certainly there are people within both Israel and the Palestinian 
Territories that consider retaliatory violence both problematic and unsatisfying. 
Unfortunately these people have been either too few or too powerless when it comes to 
controlling the violence of their countrymen. If one group, either the Palestinians or the 
Israelis, were to truly relent and opt for widespread non-violence, then GAM predicts 
that an upward spiral of peace would begin as trust grows between the two groups. 
Previous sections of this study have shown that Palestinian economic development 
reduces (or at the very least prevents the proliferation of) violence, which means that 
permitting more WBPL to work in Israel may be the catalyst needed to initiate an 
upward spiral of peace.  
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The figurative representation of the GAM in Figure 7 helps to explain how 
economic development can affect social interactions between Palestinians and Israelis. 
Given assumption number 4 (listed above), increasing the number of WBPL working in 
Israel will alter the appraisal and decision-making processes of Palestinians as 
economic development increases the opportunity-costs associated with violence. This 
should lead to thoughtful action (read non-violence) rather than impulsive action (read 
violence) during social encounters with Israeli security personnel and/or Israeli 
civilians. As more and more Palestinians replicate this thoughtful action, Israelis will 
begin to view Palestinians more favorably and will therefor be less likely to engage in 
impulsive action during social encounters. In this scenario, the established cycle of 
violence is interrupted for a cycle of peace and goodwill between the two peoples that is 
based upon growing trust. Unfortunately, the opposite of this interaction has been all-
too-common in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and compulsive action has led to 
escalating cycles of violence of varying magnitudes over the years. 
Figure 7: The General Aggression Model (GAM) 
 
 80 
3.5 Modeling the Key Parameters 
 
It is important to identify the production functions of the Israeli and the West 
Bank economies given the current state of affairs in order for the parameters in the 
model to make sense. Output in Israel is 𝒀𝒀 = 𝑨𝑨�𝑳𝑳𝜶𝜶, where L is the labor stock in Israel, 
𝑨𝑨� is TFP in Israel, and 𝜶𝜶 is the labor share of income (𝟎𝟎 < 𝜶𝜶 < 𝟏𝟏). Output in the West 
Bank is Y’=𝑨𝑨𝑳𝑳′𝜶𝜶, where 𝑳𝑳′ is the labor stock in the West Bank, 𝑨𝑨 is TFP in the West 
Bank, and 𝜶𝜶 is the labor share of income (𝟎𝟎 < 𝜶𝜶 < 𝟏𝟏) in the West Bank. Note that 𝑨𝑨 ≫ 
𝑨𝑨 due to the long-term effects of Israel’s economic policies in the West Bank and the 
negative effects of protracted conflict, which has disproportionately affected 
Palestinians economically.200 As a result of the disproportional level of development, 
many Palestinians have been both commuters and migrants to Israel since they gained 
access to the Israeli labor market in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War.  
Suppose that the Israeli government decides to increase the number of WBPL 
allowed to work in Israel at a constant rate over a given period of time in an attempt to 
increase the amount of capital flowing into the West Bank. Each additional WBPL 
permitted to work in Israel theoretically represents a risk for violence, which would 
lower the TFP associated with trust between Israelis and Palestinians if this risk is 
actualized. Each year a fraction (0 < 𝒏𝒏 < 1) of these newly permitted WBPL are 
pacified as a result of the positive economic effects of earning higher wages in Israel. 
As more West Bank Palestinians are pacified through the positive effects of economic 
development, the risk for violence during social interactions between all Israelis and 
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Palestinians is non-linearly reduced. Additionally, as more and more Israelis have high-
quality interactions with Palestinians, Israeli trust for Palestinians grows and Israelis 
will be less likely to choose impulsive actions. The relationship between the newly 
permitted WBPL and the pacification rate is represented by 𝐿𝐿�  in equation (1), where the 
new WBPL commuting to work in Israel over a given period of time (𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕 ) constitute a 
stock of labor that may or may not perpetrate violence against Israelis. 
 Eq. (1) 
𝐿𝐿� = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝑛𝑛)𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝑛𝑛)2𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−2 + ⋯ 
Arab-Israelis living in Israel constitute a stock of Palestinians who are highly 
unlikely to engage in violence and are therefore excluded from 𝑳𝑳� . In other words, Arab-
Israelis are classified as previous “migrants” who have assimilated and therefore do not 
contribute to the stock of laborers that may perpetrate violence at a given point in time 
after the policy change. This is a fairly unique case (in the post-WWII era) in which an 
indigenous group of people has assimilated to a new state created by migrants and have 
assumed a role in society that is similar to the low-skilled migrants living in other 
countries.201 One implication of this is that allowing more WBPL to work in Israel 
likely will not lead to more violence perpetrated by Arab-Israelis. There have been rare 
incidents in which Arab-Israelis have carried out attacks against Israeli citizens, but 
only 42 of 801 fatalities (0.05%) from January 2009 to October 2015 occurred within 
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Israeli territory. 202 An implication of this statistic is that the WBPL who had been 
travelling to work in Israel during that period were also not very likely to have 
perpetrated violence within Israel. However, the commuter nature of WBPL means that 
people who work in Israel or their relatives could have perpetrated violence in the West 
Bank. This means it is unclear whether allowing more West Bank Palestinians to work 
in Israel will lead to an increase or reduction of overall violence in Israel and the West 
Bank, though much of the literature suggests that such a policy intervention will reduce 
violence. Unfortunately, this makes the measurement of the Pacification Rate (n) rather 
difficult (which is discussed later). Nevertheless, WBPL are the primary agents for 
analysis in the model, and it is their rate of naturalization that will either decrease or 
increase TFP according to the degree of violence that results from their increased 
freedom of movement (regardless of whether that violence occurs in Israel or the West 
Bank).  
Suppose the number of WBPL travelling to work in Israel, p ≡ 𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕 /𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕 is 
increased at a constant rate over a given period of time. The fraction of Israel’s labor 
stock composed of WBPL who may or may not be pacified and therefore may or may 
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Note that (n) still represents the fraction of newly permitted WBPL that are pacified, so 
a higher (n) score will result in a lower 𝜙𝜙.203 This means that as 𝜙𝜙 asymptotically 
approaches 0, the level of violence that results from allowing more Palestinians to work 
in Israel should also approach 0. This is due to how the other two parameters, the 
Palestinian Propensity for Violence (v) and the Agitation score (r), relate to TFP in the 
Israeli and West Bank economies. 
Increasing the number of Palestinians legally working in the Israeli labor force 
changes TFP in Israel to… 
Eq. (3) 





where (0 < 𝒗𝒗 < 1) is the collective propensity for violence embodied in each WBPL 
travelling to work in Israel and (r ≶ 0) is the degree to which Palestinians who aren’t 
yet pacified non-linearly reduce cumulative TFP through the violence that may result 
from their increased interaction with Israelis. Note that without including Agitation 
(r=0), violence would be a function of the pre-liberalization attitudes of Israelis and 
Palestinians towards each other. This would reduce Israeli TFP during liberalization (𝑨𝑨) 
to a weighted average of pre-immigration TFP in Israel and the West Bank with weight 
(0 < v𝝓𝝓 < 1). This is however unrealistic in this context, as this would imply totally free 
movement for the newly permitted WBPL laborers without impediment by barriers or 
checkpoints, which would result in violence to the degree that pre-liberalization 
attitudes are hostile and result in impulsive (read violent) action. This is unrealistic 
because Israel is not going to dismantle all border and security measures.  
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Figure 8 shows how Israeli TFP (𝑨𝑨) is shaped by the fraction of newly permitted 
WBPL who may or may not be disposed to perpetrate violence with more freedom of 
movement. There, 𝜸𝜸 ≡  𝑨𝑨 − 𝑨𝑨 denotes the gap between Israeli and West Bank TFP; the 
production lines denote the effect of liberalizing Palestinian movement restrictions and 
integrating more Palestinians into the Israeli labor force on Israeli TFP given different 
agitation (r) values. Note that if r > 0, TFP is reduced at a much more drastic rate than it 
is increased if r < 0. In other words, if violent interactions result from increased 
freedom of movement for Palestinians, TFP is reduced quickly, but if very few or no 
violent interactions occur, then TFP is slightly increased. This is important because it 
tempers expectations and establishes a long-term time horizon (think years instead of 
months) for the positive effects of economic development in the West Bank to be 
observed, but a short-term time horizon for the negative effects of violence to be 
observed in Israel. This is intuitive, as it is much easier to see if the number of fatalities 
increases in the short-term but a long-period in which violence is slowly reduced may 
not be noticed as easily. This is consistent with the literature on how institutions and 
norms affect TFP.  
Clemens and Pritchett note that most models of norms and institutions exhibit 
multiple equilibria with high transition barriers between equilibria. In other words, once 
a norm is established, such as the cycle of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it 
is difficult to break that norm. However, they also note that norms and institutions are 
ontologically social, which renders the application of the GAM as a model of the 
relationship between economic development and violence ideal for this context. In 
Figure 8, the benefits and/or consequences are more pronounced as you move right 
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across the horizontal axis, as moving right represents a higher proportion of Palestinians 
working in Israel.  
In order to assess the relative benefits and/or consequences of the proposed 
policy change, it is necessary to evaluate how the policy may affect TFP for both 
economies. The first term of (4) is the gain to Israeli production that should result from 
the increase in labor supply. The second term is the loss to West Bank production from 
the departing labor and the level of violence that may result from the increased 
interactions occurring during the commute of the new WBPL. These definite integrals 
must be evaluated with respect to the populations of the two economies and must 











Therefore, at time t the population of Israel is 𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕 = 𝑳𝑳𝟎𝟎(𝟏𝟏 + 𝒑𝒑)t  and the gain in 
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Figure 8: Israeli Total Factor Productivity as a 










where 𝑳𝑳 is the combined labor supply in both Israel and the West Bank. This equation 
(4) forms the starting point to finding the optimal number of WBPL to permit to work in 
Israel. On one hand, you don’t want to increase the number of WBPL so drastically that 
TFP in Israel and the West Bank is at risk of a large reduction if violence increases. On 
the other, you don’t want to increase the number of WBPL so minimally that the 
positive effects of economic development have little effect on the resulting level of 
violence because the actual number of Palestinians affected by increased wages is too 
small. The optimal policy will maximize production between the two economies by 
integrating the right amount of WBPL over the best period of time. Unfortunately, this 
equation (4) is cumbersome and difficult to calculate, so it would be beneficial to 
reduce this to a more wieldy equation.  
Suppose that at time 0 (t=0), the initial population of the West Bank is a multiple 
𝜷𝜷 times the initial population of Israel, thus 𝜷𝜷 ≡ � 𝑳𝑳
𝑳𝑳𝟎𝟎
� − 𝟏𝟏 > 𝟏𝟏. The solution to (4) takes 
a tractable form using the first-order Taylor approximation that, for any Z and small x, 
(𝒁𝒁 ± (𝟏𝟏 + 𝒙𝒙)𝒕𝒕)𝜶𝜶 ≈ (𝒁𝒁 − 𝟏𝟏)𝜶𝜶 ± (𝒁𝒁 − 𝟏𝟏)𝜶𝜶−𝟏𝟏𝜶𝜶𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕. Thus, the gain per period between 
Israel and the West Bank due to decreased violence (4) reduces to… 
Eq. (5) 
𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿0𝛼𝛼(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼−1𝐴𝐴) 
Unfortunately, accounting for the elasticity of labor demand means that increasing the 
number of Palestinian laborers working in Israel reduces the TFP of Arab-Israelis, 
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foreign laborers, and other laborers living in Israel who compete for similar jobs. The 
reduction in TFP across the entire Israeli economy is greater to the degree that the 
increase in WBPL working in Israel leads to an increase in violence. However it is also 
expected that in the long-term the benefits of a widespread reduction in violence will 
increase TFP to a greater degree than the increased competition for jobs will reduce 
TFP in the short-term.  
The per-period gain in (4) corresponds to the green area in Figure 9. In that 
figure, the horizontal axis is 𝐿𝐿. The marginal product of labor is 𝒀𝒀𝑳𝑳 in Israel, and the 
labor supply in Israel is read right-to-left from origin O. The marginal product of labor 
is Y’L’ in the West Bank, and labor supply in the West Bank is read left-to-right from 
origin O’. As labor moves from the West Bank to Israel the dotted vertical line shifts to 
the left.  
This model requires a slightly different measure of TFP than is typically used. 
TFP is normally calculated as a residual and is tracked by observing the change in TFP 
over time. Since this study seeks to estimate the impact of integrating more WBPL into 
the Israeli labor force, Israel’s current TFP can be used as a normalized baseline for 
analysis. 
 Normalizing TFP in Israel  (𝑨𝑨 ≡ 𝟏𝟏) makes the loss-per-period… 
Eq. (6) 
�1 − ?̃?𝐴�𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼−1 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 
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Figure 9: The Dynamic Gains and Losses in Production Resulting from Increasing 
the Number of WBPL Working in Israel 
 
This is the red area in Figure 9. The time to complete the transition towards 
pacification between Israelis and the WBPL commuting to Israel, thereby equalizing the 
marginal product of labor, as shown in Figure 9, is T. The dynamically efficient level of 
Israeli liberalization of Palestinian labor mobility restrictions (p*) sets the present value 
benefits equal to the present value costs. In other words, the dynamically efficient rate is 
the point in time at which the negative economic effects of violence offset the positive 
economic effects of integrating more West Bank Palestinians into the Israeli labor force. 












− ?̃?𝐴)𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼−1 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 
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Fortunately, this unwieldy equation can be simplified utilizing the Taylor-
Approximation in equation (5) and over a sufficiently long transition time (T), to the 
condition: 𝐦𝐦 ∙ �𝛂𝛂𝐋𝐋𝟎𝟎
𝛂𝛂
𝛒𝛒𝟐𝟐





). Using this approximation 
and equations (2) and (3), the first-order approximation of the dynamically efficient 






where 𝜸𝜸� = 𝟏𝟏−𝑨𝑨
𝟏𝟏−𝑨𝑨𝜷𝜷𝛼𝛼−𝟏𝟏
 is a modified measure of the initial gap in productivity between 
Israel and the West Bank as is displayed graphically in Figure 8 (𝒅𝒅𝜸𝜸� 𝒅𝒅𝜸𝜸�  > 𝟎𝟎). 
 The determinants of optimal integration in equation (8) are intuitive given the 
assumptions in the model. The integration rate that maximizes cumulative economic 
production between Israel and the West Bank is greater to the extent that the 
Pacification score (n) is higher. In other words, as the Pacification score (n) increases, 
more West Bank Palestinians can be allowed freedom of movement within the West 
Bank and more WBPL can be allowed to work in Israel. Optimal migration is lower to 
the extent that: 
1. The actual level of violence is higher due to higher initial Propensity for 
Violence (v) 
2. The initial productivity gap between Israel and the West Bank, 𝜸𝜸, is higher 
3. The discount rate 𝝆𝝆 is higher  
4. Agitation (r) effects are higher, leading to high violence levels  






(𝛽𝛽 − 1 − (1 − 𝛾𝛾)
1
1−𝛼𝛼 
The determinants of 𝑻𝑻∗ are also intuitive. In addition to the inverse of those 
listed for 𝒑𝒑∗, the optimal transition time is longer to the extent that the population of the 
West Bank constitutes a larger proportion of the cumulative population of Israel and the 
West Bank. As measured by the model, the optimal transition time is longer when 𝜷𝜷 is 
larger and it is also longer when the disparity in economic outcomes between Israel and 
the West Bank is particularly stark (larger 𝜸𝜸). In other words, the optimal transition 
time lengthens as the West Bank population continues to grow relative to the Israeli 
population and as economic conditions worsen for Palestinians. 
3.6 Calibrating the Model on Current Evidence 
 
The model can be used to analyze a number of different variables, but I am 
concerned with the dynamically efficient level of Israeli-Palestinian labor integration: 
the actual number of WBPL that can be permitted to work in Israel without reducing 
Israeli TFP (which is represented by equation (8)). Some of the parameters in the 
expression for optimal integration (8) are well known, while others are unknown. 
Calibrating the model— as I attempt to do below— will be very difficult. Clemens and 
Pritchett present evidence that there isn’t a strong correlation between the number of 
migrants in a country’s labor force and TFP, which suggests that there are many other 
factors at play and that causal mechanisms are not well defined. Calibrating the model 
also requires a wide range of data specific to this context, and some of the data needed 
is unavailable in the Israeli-Palestinian context. The focus of the following sections is to 
define the parameters in the model as plausibly as possible given available data and 
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research. The known parameters of the model are explained, and the unknown 
parameters are given values based on three rational scenarios: best-case scenario, worst-
case scenario, and most likely scenario. These scenarios act as counterfactuals, and they 
establish bounds for the expected effects of increasing the number of WBPL working in 
Israel given the previously outlined assumptions that are implicit in the mathematical 
model. The values calculated for the unknown parameters in the model will be based on 
the best research and data available in order to illuminate the number of WBPL that can 
be permitted to work in Israel before Israeli TFP is reduced. Table 7 summarizes the 
known parameters, which are as follows.  
As of September 2015, there were 113,200 WBPL working in an Israeli labor 
force comprised of 3,881,000 laborers, thus p=0.029 (according to p ≡ 𝑷𝑷𝟎𝟎/𝑳𝑳𝟎𝟎).204 In 
other words, approximately 0.03% of the Israeli labor force is comprised of WBPL that 
pose a threat for violence and thereby lower productivity by reducing interpersonal 
trust. The worldwide gap between rich-and-poor-country productivity, after accounting 
for differences in human capital, is roughly 𝜸𝜸 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟖𝟖. 205 There are currently no known 
studies that measure this gap between Israel and the West Bank, and calculating this gap 
is beyond the scope of this study. I use 𝜸𝜸 = 𝟎𝟎.𝟖𝟖 for my measure of the productivity gap 
between Israel and the West Bank, but future studies using my method would benefit by 
determining this gap more precisely. Since initial Israeli TFP is normalized (𝑨𝑨 ≡ 𝟏𝟏), 
this implies that West Bank TFP is 80% lower (𝑨𝑨 ≡ 𝟎𝟎.𝟐𝟐) due to the differential levels 
                                                 
204 113,200 Palestinians working in Israel breaks down as follows: 65,100 with a permit, 35,900 without a 
permit, and 12,200 with Israeli ID or a foreign passport. Number of WBPL working in Israel found in: 
“Palestinian Labor Force Survey: Q3 2015,” Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Ramallah, West 
Bank, (2015). Israeli labor force numbers found in: “Labor Force Survey Data, February 2016,” Israeli 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, Israel (2016).  
205 Robert E. Hall, and Charles I. Jones, “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per 
Worker Than Others?” Quarterly Journal Of Economics, Vol.114, No.1, (1999): 83–116. 
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of economic development in both areas.206 Relative to the labor force of the West Bank, 
the combined labor force of Israel and the West Bank in 2014 was 𝜷𝜷 = 𝟐𝟐.98.207 These 
are the numbers that I use in my calculations of the modified productivity gap, which is 
𝜸𝜸� = 𝟏𝟏.𝟕𝟕𝟖𝟖. 208 The labor share of income (𝜶𝜶) in Israel in 2014 was 57%.209 While there 
are no statistics available for the labor share of income in the West Bank, the average 
for the developing world in the Middle East and North Africa is about 38%. However, 
the model is only concerned with Israeli TFP, thus the labor share of income is only 
relevant in Israel and the labor share of income measure is precise. All of my measures 
are context specific and precise except for the productivity gap between Israel and the 
West Bank, but future studies would benefit from a more precise measure of this gap 
because it is an important variable in the model.  
The discount rate (𝝆𝝆) for the Central Bank of Israel was 0.01% in 2014, but this 
official measure doesn’t account for individual’s decisions that subconsciously assume 
a discount rate on future earnings.210 Clemens and Pritchett set their discount rate at 
0.5%, and the RAND Corporation’s Building a Successful Palestinian State also sets 
the discount rate at 0.5% for the Palestinian economies.211 I use the plausible social 
discount rate utilized in the RAND Corporation study on the Palestinian economies 
                                                 
206 Chapter 1 discusses the economic policies that Israel has enacted in the Palestinian Territories, which 
partially explain this production gap. 
207 As explained prior to equation (5), 𝛃𝛃 = [Total Labor Force of Israel and the West Bank (5,184,900) / 
Current Labor Force of the West Bank (1,303,900)] -1 > 1. Labor Force figures obtained from the Israeli 
Central Bureau of Statistics and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.  
208 The modified productivity gap is implicit in Equation 8 and is as follows: 𝜸𝜸� = 𝟏𝟏−𝑨𝑨
𝟏𝟏−𝑨𝑨𝜷𝜷𝛼𝛼−𝟏𝟏 
209 Shlomo Swirsky, Etty Konor-Atias, Noga Dagan-Buzaglo, and Tzipi Lazar Shoef, “Workers, 
Employers And The Distribution Of Israel’s National Income – Labor Report 2014: The Report Reveals 
The Worsening Of The Share Of Workers In Israel Between 2004 and 2014,” Adva Center: Information 
On Equality And Social Justice In Israel, 1 May 2015, Web, Retrieved 1 Mar 2016, 
Http://Adva.Org/En/Workers-Employers2014/.  
210 “Israel Economy Profile 2014,” Index Mundi, Web, Retrieved 1 Mar 2016, 
Http://Www.Indexmundi.Com/Israel/Economy_Profile.Html.  
211 Building A Successful Palestinian State, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, (2007): 193. 
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(0.5%) and disregard the official discount rate from the Central Bank of Israel. A 
discount rate of 0.5% is safely within the recommended range for discount rates (1.3%-
8%) and is therefore considered a risk-free measure that will not bias results.212  
The unknown parameters for which values are personally calculated are the 
Propensity for Violence Rate (v), the Pacification Rate (n), and the Agitation Rate (r). 
Unfortunately, only the Propensity for Violence can be precisely estimated with 
available data, but the Pacification Rate and the Agitation Rate can be reasonably 
estimated. Calculating and testing different values for these three parameters will 
determine how Israeli TFP changes after more WBPL are permitted to work in Israel 
(represented by 𝑨𝑨� in Equation 3 and Figure 8). 
Table 7: Known Measures in the Model 
Measure Symbol in the 
Model 
Value 
Israeli TFP 𝑨𝑨 1 
West Bank TFP 𝑨𝑨 0.2 










Labor Share of 
Income in Israel 
𝜶𝜶 0.57 
Labor Share of 
Income in MENA 
𝜶𝜶′ 0.38 
 
Current Ratio of 






Note: All measures have been previously explained, and all sources have been 
appropriately cited in previous sections of this chapter.  
                                                 
212 Mark Harrison, “Valuing The Future: The Social Discount Rate In Cost-Benefit Analysis,” Visiting 
Research Paper, Productivity Commission, Canberra, Web, Apr 2010, Retrieved Mar 20 2016, 
Http://Www.Pc.Gov.Au/Research/Supporting/Cost-Benefit-Discount/Cost-Benefit-Discount.Pdf.  
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3.7 Calculating the Propensity for Violence (v)  
The Propensity for Violence (v) is calculated using fatality statistics in order to 
accurately estimate the degree to which violence reduces TFP. Interpersonal trust 
among Israelis and Palestinians is reduced by violence; therefore the TFP associated 
with trust is also reduced by violence to some degree. This relationship between trust 
and TFP implies that fewer WBPL should be allowed to work in Israel when the 
Propensity for Violence Rate (v) is high, which explains why the Israeli government 
imposes border closures during particularly violent times. I focus on a subset of 
violence that is precise, reliable, relevant to this context and often used in research: 
armed violence. Armed violence refers to “the intentional use of illegitimate force 
(actual or threatened) with arms or explosives, against a person, group, community, or 
state, that undermines people centered security and/or sustainable development.”213 The 
highest rates of armed violence observed during the Second Intifada determine the 
Propensity for Violence measure in the worst-case scenario, while the best-case 
scenario unrealistically assumes that economic development will reduce the rate of 
violence to 0; the best and worst case scenarios form the natural bounds (between 0 and 
1) for the Propensity for Violence (v) that is likely to be observed if more WBPL are 
permitted to work in Israel.  
The upper bound for the Propensity for Violence (v) is determined by observing 
fatality rates during the Second Intifada (2000-2005). Fatality data is often used as a 
proxy for the measurement of violence because the quality of the data is far superior to 
other measures.214 The data published by Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem is 
                                                 
213 Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Global Burden of Armed Violence, 2008, Geneva, Switzerland. 
214 The Small Arms Survey, Conflict, Crime And Violence And Development: A Compendium Of Tools 
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widely thought to be the most accurate, reliable, and unbiased information available.215 
They include information on the date, location, and circumstances of every fatal 
wounding, as well as the date of death, age, gender, the location of residence of the 
victim, and whether or not the victim was a civilian or a member of security forces. 
Since (v) is concerned with the actual level of violence that may result from giving 
Palestinians more freedom of movement within the West Bank and Israel, armed 
violence that has resulted in death anywhere within the West Bank and Israel should 
inform this measure regardless of the ethnicity of the victim, the cause of death, or other 
available information.  
Table 8 summarizes B’Tselem fatality statistics during the Second Intifada and 
separates the period into five categories based on important events that occurred 
between September 29th, 2000 and January 15th, 2005. Table 8 includes data from the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, because Palestinians from both areas worked in Israel 
prior to the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Table 9 disregards Palestinian fatality data 
from the Gaza Strip. Including fatalities from the Gaza Strip in Table 8 but not Table 9 
is not problematic; the data represented in Table 8 is used to form the bounds for the 
expected rate of violence, so it will actually set the upper bound slightly higher than it 
would be if only West Bank and Israeli fatalities are included. In addition, Israel has not 
allowed Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to work in Israel since the Second Intifada, 
                                                                                                                                               
For Measurement, Monitoring And Evaluation: Sources Of Conflict, Crime And Violence Data, Feb 
2013, Web, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/M-files/CCRVI/CCVRI-Practice-Product-
Sources-of-Data.pdf.  
215 David A Jaeger, Esteban Klor, Sami H. Miaari, and Marco D. Paserman, “The Struggle for Palestinian 
Hearts and Minds: Violence and Public Opinion in the Second Intifada,” IZA Discussion Papers No. 
3439, (2008). 
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and integrating more Palestinian laborers from the West Bank should not have an effect 
on violence originating from the Gaza Strip.  
In the worst-case scenario, increasing the number of WBPL working in Israel 
would result in approximately 6.05 fatalities per day across Israel and the Palestinian 
Territories. The worst-case scenario is determined by observing the rate of violence 
during distinct political periods in the Second Intifada to identify the most violent time 
period. Table 8 shows that the most violent period in the history of the conflict followed 
Operation Defensive Shield (which was initiated on March 29th, 2002). There were 4.25 
Palestinian fatalities per day and 1.8 Israeli fatalities per day during this period; if you 
add these rates of violence together, there were 6.05 fatalities per day in Israel and the 
Palestinian Territories during Operation Defensive Shield. This was much higher than 
the average over the entire observed period of 2.06 Palestinian fatalities per day and 
0.63 Israeli fatalities per day. If the Propensity for Violence score is 1 (v = 1), then 
integrating more WBPL into the Israeli economy would likely result in levels of 
violence similar to those observed during Operation Defensive Shield (6.05 fatalities 
per day), which would be disastrous for interpersonal trust and TFP. 
In the best-case scenario, integrating more WBPL into the Israeli labor force 
would result in 0 fatalities per day. It is theoretically possible that economic 
development could increase the opportunity cost of violence to the point that violence is 
eliminated altogether after a number of years. In this case, Palestinians would fully 
resemble Israelis in terms of posing a threat for violence, and as a result it would be 
possible to fully integrate the two societies through a political solution that creates a 
shared state or federation. Estimates based on the best-case scenario far exceed the 
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plausible number of WBPL to integrate into the Israeli labor force, indicating that it is 
possible to integrate an infinite number of WBPL without reducing Israeli TFP through 
violence. This conclusion is of course unrealistic currently. The best-case scenario is 
unlikely in the short term due to the unpredictable violence that has persisted for 
decades and the influence of anti-peace ideologies among some Palestinians and some 
Israelis. 
The Propensity for Violence score (v) in the most likely scenario is calculated by 
normalizing the rate of violence observed in Table 9 given the bounds established in 
Table 1 (0 < v < 1), where 0 is the number of fatalities per day that would occur in the 
best case scenario (v=0) and 6.05 is the number of fatalities per day that would occur in 
the worst-case scenario (v=1). Thus,  
Eq. (10) 
𝑣𝑣 =
𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 − 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛 (0)
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 (6.05) − 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛(0)
 
where 𝒇𝒇𝒕𝒕 is an observed fatality rate that occurred in Israel and the West Bank during a 
given period of time, 𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒏𝒏 is the lowest number of fatalities ever observed in Israel 
and the West Bank during a given period of time (0), and 𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒙𝒙 is the highest rate of 
violence ever observed in Israel and the West Bank (6.05), which occurred during the 
Second Intifada. The values indicated in parenthesis are the current bounds for (v), but 
𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒙𝒙 is subject to change in the future during a particularly violent time.  
 Based on the most recent fatality data available (displayed in Table 9), v=0.0375 
for August 26th, 2014 to November 30th, 2015. In practical terms, this means that the 
level of violence that will result from integrating more WBPL into the Israeli labor 
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force should be very low in comparison to previous rates of violence observed in the 
conflict. However, the most recent data available only includes fatality statistics from 
the first month of the recent wave of violence that began in October 2015, which means 
that this estimate may be biased downward. For this reason, I also test the model using 
the average fatality rate from the entire Second Intifada (v=0.446). In addition to testing 
these two estimates, I also test different values of (v) to determine the extent to which 
violence reduces TFP during turbulent and peaceful times.   
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 131 days 217 days 88 days 369 days 51 days 51 days 516 days 1570 days 
 Israelis 
Fatalities 51 116 218 160 241 7 201 994 
Fatalities/Day 0.389 0.535 1.101 1.818 0.653 0.137 0.39 0.633 
Daily Incidence of 
Fatalities 
0.237 0.212 0.318 0.341 0.187 0.098 0.107 0.19 
Share by Gunfire 0.764 0.379 0.423 0.275 0.432 0.286 0.289 0.407 
Share by Suicide 
Attacks 
0 0.422 0.44 0.613 0.461 0.571 0.587 0.479 
 Palestinians 
Fatalities 308 206 568 374 730 10 1,048 3,244 
Fatalities/Day 2.351 0.949 2.869 4.25 1.978 0.196 2.031 2.066 
Daily Incidence of 
Fatalities 
0.664 0.479 0.672 0.83 0.65 0.137 0.609 0.61 
Share by Gunfire 0.929 0.68 0.754 0.85 0.699 0.6 0.676 0.739 
Share by Aircraft 
or Tank Shelling 
0.052 0.277 0.151 0.099 0.221 0.2 0.306 0.21 




0.453 0.245 0.656 1 0.435 0.055 0.4 0.446 
Source and Notes: David Jaeger et al, “The Cycle of Violence? An Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict,” IZA 
Discussion Papers No. 1808, (2005): Table 2. Palestinian data includes the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and fatalities are classified according to 
the date and location of the fatal wounding rather than the actual date and location of death. Israeli fatality count includes all civilians and members 
of Israeli security forces killed either in Israel or in the Palestinian Territories and also include foreign civilians killed by Palestinians. The Palestinian 





Table 9: Most Recent Number and Daily Rate of Israeli and Palestinian Fatalities 






Daily Incidence of 
Fatalities 
0.039 
Share by Gunfire 0.391 
Share by Stabbing 0.348 




Daily Incidence of 
Fatalities 
0.093 
Share by Gunfire 0.96 
Share by Arson 0.034 
Propensity for Violence 
(v) 
0.0375 
Source: B’Tselem Fatality Statistics 
Notes: The methodology used in Jaeger et al, “The Cycle of Violence?” was used to categorize fatalities during this 
period. Data only includes Palestinian Fatalities in the West Bank and Israel, and fatalities are classified according to 
the date and location of the fatal wounding rather than the actual date and location of death. Israeli fatality count 
includes all civilians and members of Israeli security forces killed either in Israel or the West Bank and also include 
foreign civilians killed by Palestinians. The Palestinian Fatality count includes all civilians and members of the PA 
security forces, and also includes foreign civilians killed by Israeli security forces
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3.8 Calculating the Pacification Rate (n) 
The Israeli permit system acts as a selection effect that limits the types of 
Palestinians permitted to work in Israel to those who are already unlikely to perpetrate 
violence. This implies that WBPL who are permitted to work in Israel are already likely 
to have a high Pacification Score (n), and their higher earnings further discourages 
violence among these individuals. For these reasons, I assume that the Pacification Rate 
of newly permitted WBPL is 0.5 in the worst-case scenario and 1 in the best-case 
scenario, but I include all values between 0 and 1 in my analysis.   
The Pacification Rate (n) is precisely defined in the model by equations (1)-(3), 
but these equations reveal nothing about the determinants of the Pacification Rate (n). 
Remember that the Pacification Rate (n) measures how Palestinian Laborers come to 
resemble native Israeli laborers in terms of posing a threat for violence. In other words, 
how quickly do Palestinians come to resemble Israeli citizens in terms of posing a threat 
for violence due to the positive economic effects earning higher wages in Israel?  
The Israeli permit system is already designed to give permits to Palestinians 
with a low likelihood of perpetrating violence, so it is likely that the Pacification Rate 
(n) will be high. Tens of thousands of Palestinians are blacklisted from entering Israel 
by the Israel Security Agency. These people are prohibited from entering Israel for 
work because they are allegedly a “resident of the [West Bank] who may pose a 
security risk to the State of Israel.”216 The origin of these restrictions “is the prevailing 
presumption held by security agencies that young men who have no family represent a 
higher risk potential” and therefore may be more disposed to perpetrate violence.217 
                                                 
216 Ibid, 12. 
217 Ibid, 12. 
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Essentially, younger men are considered to have lower opportunity costs for violence 
and are therefore more of a threat. The Israeli permit system reflects these assumptions. 
Palestinian employment in Israel is restricted to a few labor-intensive sectors: 
construction, agriculture, industry, and services.218 Remember that the number of 
WBPL permitted to enter Israel is subject to quotas, which are determined by the Israeli 
government for each sector independently. In addition to the quota and sector 
restrictions, there are age and family status restrictions; Palestinians must be at least 25 
years of age and they must be married in order to obtain a permit.219 The current permit 
system has problems and inefficiencies, but it acts as a natural selection effect that 
renders the Pacification Rate (n) of newly permitted WBPL high for the purposes of this 
study. Despite the natural bounds that the permit system creates, I explored other 
methods and determined that there is no known dataset that can be used to determine a 
more precise Pacification Rate (n). 
Since violence in this context has been correlated with political attitudes, the 
Pacification Rate (n) could theoretically be determined by data relating to Palestinian 
political attitudes. However, Palestinian political attitudes are not influenced by 
violence in a homogeneous manner, the short-term effects of violence on Palestinian 
political attitudes are insignificant, and the long-term effects of violence on Palestinian 
political attitudes are unclear.220 Even if political attitudes can be measured in a 
meaningful way in the future, this does not rule out the possibility that individuals who 
are currently unlikely to perpetrate violence will not be prone to violence in the future, 
even if their economic conditions improve. For instance, it is possible that controversial 
                                                 
218 Kav LaOved, Employment of Palestinians in Israel. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Jaeger et al, “The Struggle for Palestinian”  
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incidents—such as the recent execution of a wounded Palestinian in Hebron on 24 
March 2016— can radicalize individuals who wouldn’t normally be prone to violence 
(especially relatives of Palestinians who have been killed).221 Abnormal incidents that 
are widely publicized, like the recent incident in Hebron, might encourage retaliation 
among Palestinians who wouldn’t normally take part in violence. This hypothesis is 
supported by rigorous research, which claims that fatalities have a stronger effect on 
political attitudes in the Palestinian localities affected by violence.222 Regardless of 
whether this is or is not the case, this is the line of thinking for the Israeli security 
establishment; in April 2016 hundreds of Palestinians had their permits to work in Israel 
revoked without warning because their relatives had taken part in the recent wave of 
violence.223  
In short, the causal pathway between violence and public opinion has not been 
as well defined as the causal pathway between economic conditions and violence in this 
context, though it is clear that politics matter. Additionally, there is no known dataset 
that categorizes Palestinian fatalities according to their employment location to examine 
the extent to which Palestinians working in Israel take part in violence. In the absence 
of relevant data, I use the Israeli permit system as natural bounds in order to estimate 
that the Pacification Rate (n) is likely to be between 0.5 and 1, but I include data for all 
values between 0 and 1.   
                                                 
221 Robert Mackey, “Israeli Rights Group Releases Video of Army Medic Executing Wounded 
Palestinian Suspect,” The Intercept, 24 March, 2016, Web, Retrieved 20 April, 2016, 
https://theintercept.com/2016/03/24/israeli-rights-group-releases-video-soldier-executing-wounded-
palestinian-suspect/  
222 Jaeger et al, “The Struggle for Palestinian” 
223 Jack Khoury, “Hundreds of Palestinian Laborers Discover Their Permits to Work In Israel Have Been 
Revoked,” Haaretz, 15 Apr 2016, Web, Retrieved 23 Apr 2016, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/.premium-1.714544  
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3.9 Calculating the Agitation Rate (r) 
 
Remember that the Agitation Rate (r) measures the degree to which the 
Propensity for Violence (v) and the Pacification Rate (n) change during a period in 
which more WBPL are permitted to work in Israel. If violence increases when more 
WBPL are permitted to work in Israel, it is expected that the Pacification Rate (n) will 
decrease, and conversely, if violence decreases the Pacification Rate (n) will increase. 
However, the degree to which the Propensity for Violence and the Pacification Rate 
affect each other is nonlinear. The Agitation Rate accounts for the nonlinear inverse 
relationship between these two parameters. If the Agitation Rate is 0 (r=0), the 
Propensity for Violence (v) and the Pacification Rate (n) do not have any affect on each 
other, but if the Agitation Rate is 1 (r=1), the Propensity for Violence and the 
Pacification Rate (n) are highly elastic, which means that higher levels of violence will 
drastically reduce the number of WBPL that should be permitted to work in Israel.  
When the number of WBPL commuting to work in Israel reaches a certain scale, 
it could change the nature of Israeli-Palestinian interactions; this change might 
theoretically enable violence to reach unprecedented heights if interactions turn violent, 
but it could also enable trust to accelerate if peaceful encounters persist. Unfortunately, 
no evidence exists that might inform how many WBPL would need to work in Israel 
before Agitation Effects (r) set in.224 Even though the Israeli permit system screens 
workers to mitigate the risk that WBPL will perpetrate violence, it is impossible to 
predict whether or not an individual will perpetrate violence with certainty. Clemens 
and Pritchett point out that this uncertainty makes it impossible to rule out nonlinear 
                                                 
224 George J. Borjas, “Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay,” Journal of Economic Literature, 
Vol. 53, No. 4, (2015): 961-974.  
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Agitation effects (r), but they do suggest that “if they do exist, they do not set in 
automatically even at high migrant stocks.”225 After testing for Congestion (Agitation) 
effects, Clemens and Pritchett arrive at the conclusion that “0.5 represents a 
conservatively high upper bound on the magnitude” of any true agitation effects, and 
my model supports this conclusion in the Israeli-Palestinian context. 
 While the contexts of their tests are different, I set my Agitation Rate (r) at 0.5 
for my tests in all scenarios in order to produce conservative estimates for the number 
of WBPL that can reasonably be permitted to work in Israel. However, I discuss how 
the results of the model change at different Agitation Rates (r) in the robustness checks. 
In the absence of a precise measure of the Pacification Rate (n) and a precise measure 
of the Agitation Rate (r), I test the model using different values for both measures to 
estimate a plausible dynamically efficient number of WBPL to permit to work in Israel.
                                                 




Initial tests show that the best and worst-case scenarios are not particularly 
helpful. In the best-case scenario, the parameters suggest that WBPL are nearly 
identical to Israeli laborers in terms of posing a risk for violence. This makes the 
number of WBPL that Israel can integrate infinite because they are essentially the same 
as the Israeli laborers that already determine Israeli TFP. In the worst-case scenario, the 
parameters suggest that all WBPL pose a significant risk for violence, and Israeli TFP 
would be drastically reduced if more WBPL were permitted to work in Israel. 
Establishing the bounds are between 0 and infinity is not particularly helpful. However, 
the results of the model—even when tested for a range of measures— show that the 
number of WBPL permitted to work in Israel should be increased in order to achieve 
the dynamically efficient rate of integration.  
Figure 10 shows how many WBPL should be permitted to work in Israel given 
different Propensity for Violence (v) rates. In Figure 10, the y-axis is the Pacification 
Rate (n) and the x-axis is the number of WBPL that should be added or removed from 
the Israeli labor force (starting from 0) in order to keep Israeli TFP at its current level. 
The y-intercept for each line reveals the Pacification Rate (n) needed before it is 
advisable to integrate more WBPL into the Israeli labor force given that line’s 
Propensity for Violence (v) rate.  
For example, when v=0.446 (the average for the Second Intifada) it isn’t 
advisable to allow WBPL into Israel unless their Pacification Rate exceeds 0.4 (n=0.4). 
Keeping with the same Propensity for Violence line (v=0.446), when n=0.5 it is 
possible to permit 419,917 WBPL to work in Israel and Israeli TFP will stay at its 
 107 
current level. This is because the moderately high pacification rate erodes the negative 
effects of violence on Israeli TFP over time. When v=0.7 and n=0.5, you would 
theoretically need to remove 394,443 WBPL from the Israeli economy in order to keep 
Israeli TFP at its current levels. This is because the high Propensity for Violence (v) 
erodes the Pacification Rate (n) and reduces the Israeli TFP associated with 
interpersonal trust. Since the Israeli permit system sets natural bounds for the 
Pacification Rate (n), 0.7 is the threshold for the Propensity for Violence (v) in the 
model; integrating more WBPL into the Israeli labor force does not pose a significant 
threat for violence as long as v < 0.7.  
In Figure 10, nearly all parameter estimates point to the conclusion that the 
current number of WBPL working in Israel is not dynamically efficient. For most of the 
parameter estimates the corresponding number of WBPL that should be permitted to 
work in Israel is at least several times the current level and in many cases the estimates 
exceed the working population of the West Bank. This is consistent with the findings in 
Clemens and Pritchett on global migration and production; in both cases, the number of 
foreigners (WBPL) that it would take to noticeably reduce TFP in a rich country (Israel) 
is unrealistically high, because in most scenarios people migrating to work are unlikely 
to affect rich country (Israeli) TFP through violence or other activities. Even in the 
cases when the WBPL should be theoretically removed in Figure 10, the Propensity for 
Violence (v) and Pacification Rates (n) required to make such an action advisable are 
not very likely.  
In Table 10 it is clear that Israeli TFP is very sensitive to violence, because the 
number of WBPL that should be added to or removed from the Israeli economy changes 
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drastically at different Propensity for Violence (v) and Pacification Rates (n). In the 
most recent period analyzed (v=0.375), a Pacification Rate (n) of only 0.05 is needed in 
order make the current number of WBPL working in Israel (113,200) advisable. This 
implies that actual Pacification Rate (n) of WBPL would need to be reduced drastically 
(if we assume it is between 0.5 and 1) in order to make Israel’s current number of 
permits dynamically efficient. The results of the model suggest that Israel can increase 
the number of WBPL permitted to work in Israel far above what is practically possible, 
and Israeli TFP will not be harmed as long as the rate of violence stays below 4.2 
fatalities per day over a given period of time (v=0.7)
Robustness Checks 
It is entirely plausible that the Agitation Rate (r) could be much smaller, and 
when I tested the model for r=0.01 the results did not change in any meaningful 
manner. The slope of the lines became smaller, revealing that the number of WBPL that 
you can integrate increases drastically as r approaches 0, but the thresholds observed in 
Table 10 did not change. In other words, as long as WBPL have a Pacification Rate of 
at least 0.7 (which is entirely plausible given the permit system), it is possible to 
increase the number of permits to an infinite amount if r=0.01. Even if it is unrealistic, I 
tested the model using 0.99 as my agitation rate (r) in the worst-case scenario. Even if 
r=0.99, it is still possible to integrate more WBPL than is realistically possible as long 
as n < 0.7, but the number of WBPL that the model estimates does decrease drastically. 
This is consistent with the determinants of optimal migration listed after equation (8), 
which states that optimal migration is lower to the extent that Agitation effects (r) are 
higher. 
 109 
I tested the model using different measures for the social discount rate, and the 
model supported the other two determinants of optimal migration listed after equation 
(8). When the social discount rate is increased, the y-intercepts observed in Figure 10 
move up the y-axis, and the number of WBPL that should be permitted into the Israeli 
economy decreases. This implies that the number of WBPL that should be allowed into 
Israel is lower to the extent that interpersonal trust is already lower at the time that more 
permits are allotted, thereby leading people to discount future earnings to a greater 
extent. However, even in this case it is advisable to increase the number of WBPL 
permitted to work in Israel as long as v < 0.3. In other words, a policy aimed at 
increasing the number of WBPL permitted to work in Israel (such as the 30,000 person 
increase passed in February) will be most effective if implemented during times with 
low rates of violence rather than times with high rates of violence. Changing the 
adjusted productivity gap between Israel and the West Bank also changes the threshold 
for violence. As the productivity gap increases, the number of WBPL that can be 
permitted to work in Israel without decreasing Israeli TFP is decreased. This is 
consistent with the literature on the relationship between economic development and 
violence in this context; when economic conditions are more unequal between the two 
areas it is more likely that Palestinians will engage in violent revolt, which would 
decrease Israeli TFP. However, even the high estimates provided by my model are 
conservative estimates.  
There are a number of assumptions implicit in the dynamic equilibrium model 
that makes the dynamically efficient estimates conservative. First, the model assumes 
that increasing the number of WBPL permitted to work in Israel can only reduce Israeli 
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TFP through violence, but this ignores the fact that a significant reduction in violence 
could potentially increase TFP over time. This implies that the model does not account 
for the gain in Israeli production that would be observed in each time period after the 
dynamically efficient rate is reached. In other words, the gain in production that begins 
at time T* (Equation 9) and continues to infinity in the steady-state is not accounted for 
in the estimates, which make them downward bias. The model does not account for the 
positive effects of economic development on people living in the West Bank who are 
not working in Israel. In other words, the model does not take into account that higher 
earnings increases the opportunity cost of violence for Palestinians due to spillover 
effects from the higher earnings of family members and/or community members. Such 
spillover effects could reduce the Propensity for Violence likely to be observed 
overtime and would therefore make the model’s current estimates downward biased. 
Finally, the Agitation Rate used in Figure 10 (r=0.5) is a conservative choice, and it is 
entirely possible that actual Agitation Rates could be lower.  
 While my model suggests that Israel can drastically increase the number of 
WBPL permitted to work in Israel in most cases, future studies would benefit from 
more precise estimates of the actual Pacification Rate (n) and Agitation Rate (r). 
Additionally, the model does support the use of border closures or other security 
measures in certain cases. Any point left of the y-axis on the model represents a time in 
which border closures or other security measures are advisable, but in most cases the 
Propensity for Violence (v) and Pacification Rate (n) needed to make border closures 
justified are not very likely. Some of the other measures, such as the productivity gap 
(𝛄𝛄), are well defined but not context specific. Regardless of the assumptions that I was 
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forced to make, robustness checks support the conclusion that Israel can increase the 
number of WBPL permitted to work in Israel, and it is likely that more accurate 
measures of my assumed values in the model will also produce results that support this 
conclusion. Even though this model is specific to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is 
likely that my method of analyzing how violence affects TFP (in the context of 






Figure 10: The Dynamically Efficient Number of West Bank Palestinian Laborers Permitted to Work in Israel 
 
Note: This figure models equation 8, which returns a decimal that shows the ratio of Palestinian labor to Israeli labor that should be allowed into the Israeli labor 
force. When p* is plugged back into the equation p ≡ 𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕 /𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕 it is possible to calculate the actual number. I altered equation 8 in order to calculate this number, 
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Table 10: The Dynamically Efficient Number of West Bank Palestinian Laborers 
That Should be Permitted to Work in Israel Given Plausible Parameter Measures 
 Propensity for Violence (v) 
Pacification 
Rate  
   (n)* 
0.0375** 0.1 0.3 0.446*** 0.7 0.9 
0.5 3,365,821 2,652,031 1,124,186 419,917 0 0 
0.6 4,087,132 3,297,294 1,606,669 827,366 0 0 
0.7 4,808,444 3,942,558 2,089,153 1,234,815 246,927 0 
0.8 5,529,756 4,587,821 2,571,636 1,642,264 567,613 0 
0.9 6,251,068 5,233,084 3,054,119 2,049,713 888, 298 271,890 
1 6,972,379 5,878,347 3,536,603 2,457,162 1,208,984 546,526 
Note: Agitation Rate (r)=0.5 
*      The Pacification Rate (n) is only displayed from 0.5-1 because the Israeli permit system acts 
as a natural selection effect, as was explained 
**    (v)=0.0375 during the period August 26th, 2016 and October 11th, 2016  
***  (v)=0.446 during the entire Second Intifada period, but Table 1 shows that this varied during 




 This study has traced the economic history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
with particular emphasis on the ways in which economics, politics, and violence have 
evolved since the 1967 Six-Day War. Unfortunately, peace has remained elusive despite 
the clear economic advantages that a peaceful resolution to the conflict has for both 
peoples. Current evidence on the relationship between economics development, politics, 
and violence point to economic development policies as the most fruitful path forward. 
The dynamic equilibrium model in this study presents strong evidence that 
allowing more West Bank Palestinians to work in Israel will not reduce Israeli 
economic productivity, and more importantly, will promote a more trusting 
environment for political negotiations as violence is reduced through Palestinian 
economic development. It is however naïve to think that Palestinian aspirations for a 
sovereign state will be altogether extinguished by economic development. While many 
analysts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict hold peace to be a utopian impossibility, it is 
precisely the impossibility of the aim that sustains efforts towards its completion.  
The traditional utterance of the Passover Seder, “next year in Jerusalem,” is a 
reminder of the impossibility of being in the philosophical Jerusalem, a place that 
embodies the utopian human existence to which one must always aspire, even while 
living in the dystopian reality that is embodied in the geographic Jerusalem (and in the 
broader world).226 Jerusalem is perhaps the most poignant physical embodiment of the 
ways in which competing visions for a better life—whether between Jews and Arabs, 
Americans and Soviets, or any other conflicting groups— produce conflict and 
                                                 
226 Elliot R Wolfson, “Assaulting the Border: Kabbalistic Traces in the Margins of Derrida,” Journal of 
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 115 
suffering. This study has argued that economic development holds the key to unlocking 
a path towards peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but I return to the Rashomon 
effect with which this venture began; only when competing visions for the future find a 
middle ground for cooperation is progress possible, and economic development is 
currently the most promising method through which Israelis and Palestinians can move 
towards a middle ground.  
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